The U.S. Andean drug strategy: why it is failing in Peru by Cutting, Richard B.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1993-12
The U.S. Andean drug strategy: why it is failing in Peru
Cutting, Richard B.




A$ v S#AD-A278 006




The U.S. Andean Drug Strategy:





I' Thesis Advisor: Thomas C. Bruneau
T-mew---
I
__ Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
94 4 11 08y
Unclassified
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
La. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION lb. RESIRIC-IVE MARKINGS
Unclassified Unclassified
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY I. DISTRIBUTION/ AVAILABILITY OF REPORT
2b._______________________________SCHEDULE_ Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCtHEDULE
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORI NUMBER(S)
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 6 Ob. FFICE SYMBOL 7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
Naval Postgraduate School (i0 Applcable) Naval Postgraduate School
6L. ADDRESS (ci.y, state. and7lcoe) 7b. ADDRESS c)ly. state. and ZIP cmiel
Monterey. CA 93943-5000 Monterey. CA 93943-5000
8a NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING 6h. (OFFI('E SYMBOL 9. PROCI'REMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
ORGANIZATION App lic'ible I
8c. ADDRESS (city. state, and ZIP code) 10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS
PROGRAM PROJECT TASK WORK UNII
ELEMENT NO. INO. NO. ACCESSION NO.
11. TITLE (Include Securire Cla~ssicaton )
THE U.S. ANDEAN DRUG STRATEGY: WHY IT IS FAILING IN PERU
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)
Cutting, Richard B.
3. ITYPh U REPYRT 1. TIMEC 0(V1:RE1 14. DAT OFREP(year. nonthgday) 13. PAGECOUNT
Master's Thesis FROM To December 1993 137
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION
The views expressed in this thesis are those of 'he author and do not reflect •e official policy or position of the Deptrtment of
Defense or the U.S. Government.
17. COSATI CODES 18. Si TBJECT TERMS (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
IELD GROUP SUBGROUP I I.S. National Drug Control Policy, cocaine, sovereignty, Sendero Luminoso.
political conditions. rural conditions
19. SRCI (Continue on reverse if necessary and uienttv 7 =)lork numi',r)
This thesis will demonstrate Peru's inability to physically operate and politically control large sections of the
country, is the result of eroded internal state .overeignty. The decline of Peru's internal sovereignty is a function of
economic, ethnic, and social cleavages which have remained virtually unchanged since the Spanish Conquest of the Inca
in 1533. As a result, Peru evolved into a polarized society which is ethnically and culturally divided, with a
substantially wide margin between state authority and rural social autonomy. This marginalization of state sovereignty
has facilitated the emergence and growth of the Shining Path insurgency, which has coupled with the expanding cocaine
trade. Together these two processes have accelerated the erosion of functional sovereignty in Peru. Given this reality,
the policy goals set forth by the 1992 National Drug Control Strategy remain unattainable in Peru, and have little
prospect for success.
20. DIST1RIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OFAIBSTRACTI 21. ABSTRACTSECITRITY CLASSIFICATION
F- UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED 0 SAME AS RPT. Et [,TIC ITSERS Unclassified
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE IUDSAMEUAL 22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area 22c. OFFICE SYMBOL
Thomas C. Bruneau C(,le) Code NS/Be(408) 656-2521
DD 1O 1473. 84 MAR 83 APR edton may be tued until exhauted SECT Ri - LASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
All uther editions are obsolete Unclassified
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
The U.S. Andean Drug Strategy:
Why it is failing in Peru
by
Richard B. Cutting
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.A. University of California, Riverside, 1980
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of






Thomas fu, Thesis Advisor
Thomas C. Bruneau, Chairman,
Department of National Security Affairs
ii
Abstract
This thesis will demonstrate Peru's inability to
physically operate and politically control large sections of
the country, is the result of eroded internal state
sovereignty. The decline of Peru's internal sovereignty is a
function of economic, ethnic, and social clevages which have
remained virtually unchanged since the Spanish Conquest of the
Inca in 1533. As a result, Peru evolved into a polarized
society, which is ethnically and culturall divided, with a
substantially wide margin existing between state authority and
rural social autonomy. This marginalization of state
sovereignty has facilitated the emergence and growth of the
Shining Path insurgency, which has coupled with the expanding
cocaine trade. Together these two processes have accelerated
the erosion of sovereignty in Peru. Given this reality, the
policy goals of supply reduction set forth by the 1992
National Drug Control Strategy remain unattainable in Peru,
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. WHY A DRUG WAR
On any given day, in virtually any city in the United
States, large and small quantities of illicit drugs are
changing hands. Drug use, trafficking, and associated violence
are virtually everywhere, affecting even the most insulated
social circles and communities.' Marijuana, methamphetamines,
cocaine, crack cocaine, heroin, and hallucinogens permeate the
media, bringing images of gang violence, property crime, and
teen-age addiction into the homes of anyone watching
television or reading the newspaper.
Within the circle of drug trafficking and abuse, the
popularity and profit margin of cocaine over the last twenty
years caused it to emerge as one of the central domestic and
foreign policy concerns for the United States. 2 During the
Reagan Administration domestic drug control was directly
linked to national security, and a "war" was declared on
'U.S.Department of Justice, A National Report: Drugs, Crime,
and the Justice System, (Washington, D.C., 1992), p. 8.
2Davis T. Courtwright, "Drug Legalization, the Drug War, and
Drug Treatment in Historical Perspective," Drug Control Policy:
Essays in Historical and Comparative Perspective, ed. William 0.
Walker III (Pittsburg, 1992), p. 43. The Omnibus Antidrug laws of
1986 and 1988 provided the legal framework for the subsequent
antidrug legislation of 1989 and 1990.
1
illegal drugs which has continued through the current
administration. 3 As a result the United States formulated a
policy targeting cocaine and a strategy for reducing domestic
demand by decreasing the supply flowing unimpeded from the
Latin American source countries of Peru, Bolivia, and
Colombia. 4
This thesis will demonstrate Peru's inability to
physically operate and politically control large sections of
the country, are the result of eroded internal state
sovereignty. The decline of Peru's internal sovereignty is a
function of economic, ethnic, and social clevages which have
remained virtually unchanged since the Spanish Conquest of the
Inca in 1533. As a consequence, Peru evolved into a polarized
society, with a substantially wide margin existing between
state authority and rural social autonomy. This
marginalization of state sovereignty has facilitated the
emergence and growth of the Shining Path insurgency, which has
coupled with the expanding cocaine trade. Together these two
processes accelerated the erosion of sovereignty in Peru.
3The White House, National Security Strategy of the United
States, (Washington, D.C., January 1993), p. 18.
4U.S. Department of Justice; Drug Enforcement Agency, Drug
Enforcement: Counterattack on Cocaine, (Washington, D.C., 1982). p.
6-9. Although the National Drug Control Strategy and Andean Drug
Strategy were not formally signed until 1989, the Reagan
Administration began early attempts at coca leaf eradication in
joint U.S/Peru effort "Operation Green Sea II", 1980.
2
Given this reality, the policy goals of supply reduction
set forth by the 1992 National Drug Control Strategy remain
unattainable in Peru, with little prospect for success.' Coca
eradication in source countries is absolutely critical to the
reduction of cocaine trafficking in the United States as
outlined by the National Drug Strategy. 6 Since Peru is firmly
established as the largest producer of coca in the world,
supplying over 63% of the coca paste,' it is the pivotal case
in testing the strategy of drug eradication at the source.4
Beginning in the early 1980s, the United States has allocated
several billion dollars annually in pursuit of viable methods
5United States Congress, House of Representatives, Th_e
Situation in Peru and the Future of the War on Drugs, Joint Hearing
before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, (Washington,
D.C., May 7, 1992). p. 1. Opening remarks by Rep. Robert G.
Torricelli (D-New Jersey), addressing territory under control of
the Shining Path and narcotics traffickers.
6United States Senate, Review of the National DruQ Control
StrateQy, Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, February
6, 1991, !Washington, D.C., 1991), p. 58. Andean coca farmers are
considered to be the "root of supply of drugs."
7U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, National Narcotics IntelliQence
Consumers Committee Report, 1991, (Washington, D.C., 1992), p. 14.
Peru is the world's largest coca producer, cultivating an estimated
3-400,000 acres of coca annually.
8United States Congress, House of Representatives, Cocaine
Production in the Andes, Hearing before the Select Committee on
Narcotics Abuse and Control, June 7, 1989, (Washington, D.C.,
1989), p. 4.
3
for drug enforcement, interdiction, and eradication, despite
disheartening performance assessments and statistical data.'
Specificai.y, this thesis examines why the coca
eradication strategy attempted by the United States has
repeatedly failed in Peru despite a concerted effort to stem
production." The argument addresses the erosion of
sovereignty and its impact on the inter-relationship of three
political actors involved in coca production and
counternarcotic efforts; the state; the Shining Path
insurgency; and, the rural coca growing society.
B. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The question of how to reduce coca growing and cocaine
production in Peru cannot be answered without first addressing
the issue of eroded and displaced internal sovereignty, as the
former is not possible without the latter.
Sovereignty in the context of this thesis is defined as
the ability of the state to exercise supreme authority within
9Department of Justice, A National Report: Drugs. Crime, and
the Justice System, (Washington, DC, 1992), p. 48-57. Approximately
$11.7 billion was appropriated in 1992 to fund the National Drug
Control Strategy, of which $2 billion was directed towards source
country eradication.
'ýU.S. General Accounting Office, The Drua War: U.S. Programs
in Peru Face Serious Obstacles, (Washington, D.C., October 1991),
p. 20. The total annual seizure of cocaine base in 1990 was 4
metric tons, roughly equal to one week's production in one village
in the Upper Huallaga Valley.
4
certain geographic, social, and political parameters, both
internal and external." Although internationally recognized
as a externally sovereign state, Peru has historically
suffered internal marginalization of state authority within
large sections of its territorial boundaries." The
displacement or erosion of Peruvian state authority has in
turn facilitated the recent emergence of two major illegal
activities,"3 both of which directly threaten the continued
existence of the state. In turn, the significant erosion, or
loss of functional state sovereignty creates room for
subsequent emergence (or enlargement) of illegitimate
activities."
The evolution of sovereignty is a dual process requiring
the nation-state to internally establish social and political
control within its defined territorial boundaries, which in
"Joseph A. Camilleri, "Rethinking Sovereignty," Contending
Sovereignties: Redefining Political Community, ed. R.B.J. Walker
and Saul H. Mendlovitz (Boulder, 1989), p. 15.
'
2Jose Carlos Mariategui, "Regionalism and Centralism," Seven
Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality, Lima, 1928, translated by
Marjory Urquidi, (Austin, 1971), p. 153.
13The Shining Path insurgency and the cocaine trade. Although
the growth and use of coca dates to the pre-Inca period, the
expansion of the industry into an export commodity, and subsequent
use of it for national level financing by the Shining Path has
occurred since 1983.
"
4Richard Falk, "Evasions of Sovereignty," Contending
Sovereignties: Redefining Political Community, p. 74.
5
turn leads to the recognition of external sovereignty by the
international community.
External sovereignty is not conditional on the internal
political structure established by the state, but is governed
by the standards for statehood established under the
Montevideo Conference of 1933. These parameters for statehood
are still employed by the United Nations when recognizing
sovereign nation-states."5 If a state has established
territorial boundaries, and possesses the capability to
enforce its political will, then it is recognized as a
sovereign nation-state.' 6
Internal sovereignty varies in degrees and is solely
determined by the ability of the state to extend functional
and supreme authority. The support mechanisms of state power
include political constituencies which may embrace the entire
population, or be limited to small groups controlling various
forms of power." Ultimately, the extent of sovereignty
"
5Daniel S. Papp, Contemporary International Relations:
Frameworks for Understanding, (New York, 1991), p. 494.
"
6Larry Diamond and Juan Linz, "Politics, Society, and
Democracy in Latin America,", Democracy in DevelopinQ Countries:
Latin America, ed. Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin
Lipset, (Boulder, 1989), p. 19-27.
1 Juan Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, (Baltimore,
1978), p. 5.
6
exercised by a given political actor is a component of state
institutional power and coercive capability."8
One of the cornerstones to establishing functional
sovereignty within national borders is the presence and
effective performance of state institutions. Conversely, the
absence or decay of state institutions will usually result, or
be manifested, in the emergence of activities to fill the
particular economic, political, or social need, which may be
detrimental to the authority of the state. 1 9 Theoretically,
institutionally weak regimes exercise lower levels of
functional sovereignty, which results in the erosion of state
ability to control society without coercive force. 2"
Within virtually every nation-state there exists illegal
activity in various forms, and at assorted levels of
intensity. The ability of the state to modify this
illegitimate counter-productive behavior is based upon its
legitimacy, institutional strength, and coercive potential. 2 1
These factors enable the state to support functional
"
18Camilleri, p. 15-17.
19Robert A. Dahl, Polvarchy: Participation and Opposition,
(Yale University Press, 1971),p. 121.
20Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory
and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, (Harvard University
Press, 1957), p. 1.
21John Boli, "Sovereignty From A World Polity Perspective"
(Presented at the annual meetings of the American sociological
Association, Miami, August 1993), p. 10-11.
7
sovereignty, and allow it to effectively raise the operating
costs to the level which reduces or eliminates the
illegitimate activity. States which are internally weak in any
of these areas become susceptible to a variety of social and
political ills that left unchecked may ultimately undermine
the influence of state institutional authority, and impede its
capacity to effect domestic or foreign policy.2 2
Additionally, any political system founded without some
form of institutional checks and balances used to modify
unacceptable social and political behavior, experiences
erosion of state authority.23 The decline of state authority
reduces functional sovereignty and ultimately allows
illegitimate activities to expand. 24 The state must then
weigh the costs of toleration against the costs of suppressing
the activity.25
Toleration of the illegitimate activity may allow it to
become entrenched and establish counter-institutions or
cultures to the state. The cost of suppression then becomes
substantially higher when sovereignty is contended by an
22F.H. Hinsley, Sovereiqnty (Cambridge, 1986), p. 25.
23Carl Schmitt, Political Theoloqy: Four Chapters on the
Concept of SovereiQnty, (Berlin, 1922), p. 24-26.
24Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Rebellion and Authority: An
Analytic Essay on InsurQent Conflicts, (Rand Corporation, 1970), p.
71-75.
2 5Leites and Wolf, p. 46.
8
illegitmate activity seeking to politically displace the
state. The state finds itself in a battle to reestablish
authority and achieve political compliance. 2 6 The more appeal
and popular support the illegitimate activity sustains, or the
higher the degree of its organizational strength, the greater
the possibility for expansion. As the illegitimate activity
expands over time, it becomes institutionalized, and state
authority is further displaced.2" If the illegitimate
activity is politically based, or militarily capable, it may
eventually fill the vacuum created by the recession of state
authority and directly challenge sovereignty. 28
Sovereignty must therefore be conceptualized as a
spectrum, which ranges from full political control on one end,
to complete fragmentation of state authority at the other.
The area in between the two extremes effectively becomes the
operating margin of state sovereignty or a contending
political actor. It is within this operating margin that
illegitimate activity becomes cost effective and instigated
or expanded. 29  If viewed on Table I, indicators of
26Dahl, p. 14-16.
2 7Dahl, p. 15.
"
28Richard Falk, "Evasions of Sovereignty," Contending
Sovereicnties: Redefining Political Community, ed. R.B.J. Walker
and Saul H. Mendlovitz (Boulder, 1990), p. 74.
29Falk, p. 46.
9
functional state sovereignty are; ultimate authority;
territorial control; social and political compliance; and,
efficacious institutions. The indicators of eroded or
displaced sovereignty are; erosion in state authority;
restricted or denied access to territory; belligerent
behavior; and, counter-institutions.
TABLE I
Range of Functional State Sovereignty
STATE OPERATING CONTENDING
SOVEREIGNTY MARGINS OF SOVEREIGNTY
SOVEREIGNTY
- ultimate - authority
authority .................. eroded or
displaced
- territorial ..................- restricted
control access
- political ..................- illegitimate or
compliance belligerent
behavior
- efficacious - counter
institutions .................. institutions
This thesis focuses on the relationship of functional
internal sovereignty and domestic control. In the case of
Peru, sovereignty is constitutionally established, but lacks
efficacious institutional and administrative presence to be
10
recognized throughout the country. 30 State neglect results in
social, political, and economic needs which have been
successfully addressed by the cocaine trade and Shining Path
insurgency." The rise of the insurgency has in turn
displaced state control in large sections of the country,
propagated the cocaine trade, and contributed to the continued
marginalization of state sovereignty. By operating in areas of
marginalized state authority, the Shining Path and the coca
trade have become institutionalized and internally sovereign.
Consequently, in order for the state to exercise functional
sovereignty and effect ultimate authority it must first;
a) reestablish territorial parameters, and physically
control the ground within these boundaries;
b) control social and political behavior which threaten
to significantly alter or displace the national
polity, state institutions, or social fabric;
c) eliminate, control, or assimilate any and all
challenges to state authority, legitimacy, or
efficacy."
3 0Julio Colter, "Democracy and National Integration in Peru,"
The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered, ed. Cynthia McClintock and
Abraham F. Lowenthal (Princeton, 1983), p. 37.




The ability of the state to control is crucial when
discussing Peru's sovereignty, and may be addressed through
various forms of political compliance or coercion. Without
ultimate control, government claims to sovereignty are
empty. 3" Any rhetoric that addresses establishing,
maintaining, or preserving sovereignty that lacks the power to
control becomes irrelevant. 34
Utilizing Peru as a case study, this model examines the
erosion and displacement of state sovereignty, and the
enlargement of two major illegitimate activities; the Shining
Path insurgency; and, the coca trade. This thesis argues that
the state of Peru has been established on historically weak
political and social foundations and as a result its national
institutions extend only to urbanized or garrisoned areas
where political coercion may be asserted by state force.3 5 It
also argues that displaced state sovereignty has been
institutionally replaced by the Shining Path "counterstate",
"
33Gardels, Nathan and Abraham Lowenthal, "'We Will Finish Off
the Shining Path': An Interview with Peruvian President Alberto
Fujimori," Mercurio, (Santiago, Chile, June 19, 1993).
34
"Peru: Fujimori 'Saturday Focus' Interview," ForeiQn
Broadcast Information Service: Latin America Daily Report, FBIS-
LAT-93-172-S (Washington, D.C., September 8, 1993), p. 2. During
this interview, President Fujimori stresses the reassertion of
state authority and institutions in rural districts.
35Daniel M. Masterson, Militarism and Politics in Latin
America: Peru from Sanchez Cerro to Sendero Luminoso, (New York,
1991), p. 280.
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which is effecting its own contending sovereignty throughout
the countryside. 36 The cocaine trade, provides the peasant
with a functional market economy in the absence of legitimate
state enterprises, and supplies coca tax revenues to the
Shining Path.. 7
Each of the three actors; the state; the insurgency; and,
the coca trade; are analyzed separately based on certain
propositions applicable to each:
a) The state must be institutionally stronger than the
illegitimate activities. To be functionally sovereign it must
substantially raise the cost to operate higher than the
activity is willing to tolerate. The state must also reduce
the operating areas of the activity, and reestablish the
states rural institutional power base to maintain sovereignty
and prevent further marginalization of state authority.
b) In order to establish itself, an illegitimate activity
must raise the relative cost of sovereignty to a point that
the state cannot maintain control. To accomplish this, the
activity must; operate within the institutional vacuum created
36United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee
on Foreign Affairs, The Threat of The ShininQ Path to Democracy in
Peru, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere
Affairs, March 11 and 12, 1992 (Washington, D.C., 1992). p. 17-23.
Prepared statement of Gordon H. McCormick.
3 7Gordon H. McCormick, The Shining Path and the Peruvian
Narcotics Trade, (Rand Corporation, June 1992). p. 4-15. The cocaine
trade is a source of large scale financing and manpower
for the Shining Path.
13
by a weak state; satisfy a social, economic, or political
demand; and, present a viable alternative to its targeted
constituency in order to achieve political compliance,
mobilize resources and establish safe operating zones.
c) The coca trade is the result of economic
underdevelopment by the state, and the expansion of global
demand for cocaine. The subsequent integration of the Shining
Path with the cocaine trade compounds the problem of state
sovereignty because coca eradication efforts alienate rural
society, and ultimately expands the insurgent support base.
This in turn frustrates the state counterinsurgency program,
leads to increased repression and further erodes sovereignty.
To summarize the argument, this thesis will demonstrate
the erosion of sovereignty in the state of Peru. It has ceded
the ability to effect control over much of its territory and
population. Since 1980, Peru has experienced a dramatic
recession of state institutions. The decline of: rural tax
revenues; electoral participation; hospitals; schools; police
stations; local governmental officials; and, state owned
enterprises, all show the loss of functional state
sovereignty. Although the marginalization of sovereignty has
been a continuing process throughout the history of the
Peruvian state, the 1980 emergence of the Shining Path and the
cocaine trade have served as catalysts in the acceleration of
state decay. Additionally, the Shining Path has demonstrated
14
its ability to continually displace the sovereignty of the
state and repl'ce it with functional counterstate institutions
and administrative organizations.
C. FORMAT
Within the framework, this thesis will focus on each of
the three actors, and analyze the capability of each to
sustain its goals. The format of the argument is segmented
into five sections which are mutually supportive to the
overall theme.
-Part two of this thesis will provide: a historic
background on the United States' counternarcotics legislation
and policies; an overview of the Andean Drug Strategy and its
goals; and, an analysis of performance data through 1992.
-Part three will analyze the historic variables impeding
internal sovereignty and focus on the Peruvian government
since the military coup of 1968. This section examines the
historic depth of internal political control exercised by the
state, the continued erosion of sovereignty during the last
five regimes, and the effects of the counterinsurgency
programs attempting to modify illegitimate behavior.
-Part four will examine the emergence and enlargement of
illegitimate activities: the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso)
insurgency; and, the Peruvian cocaine trade. Discussed is the
degree of insurgent organization, institutional alternatives,
15
involvement in the coca trade; and, support of the rural
peasantry.
-Part five will conclude with an analysis of the actors
and internal variables in relation to U.S. policy goals and
options.
16
I. U.S. DRUG CONTROL POLICY
All of us agree that the gravest domestic threat
facing our nation today is drugs... In short, drugs are
sapping our strength as a nation. 38
- President George Bush
September 5, 1989
The United States, like other modern and industrialized
nations, is afflicted with a social pariah which has defied
regulation, legislation, and punitive action. Drugs, such as
alcohol, marijuana, tobacco, heroin, cocaine, are exceedingly
popular in the United States, and statistically millions of
Americans are users. 3 9 In 1992, the United States had an
estimated 700,000 heroin addicts, 7-15 million cocaine users,
and 20-25 million marijuana smokers. 40This equates to an
approximate annual consumption of 12 tons of heroin, 65 tons
of marijuana, and 150 tons of cocaine. Although the
consumption of illegal drugs generates over $100 billion into
the economy annually, the ramifications in the increase of
38
"The President's Speech on National Drug Control Strategy,"
New York Times, September 6, 1989.
"John C. McWilliams, "Through the Past Darkly: The Politics
and Policies of America's Drug War," DruQ Control Policy: Essays in
Historical and Comparative Perspective, ed. William 0. Walker
(Pennsylvania State Press, 1992), p. 5.
4 0United States Department of Justice, p. 28.
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violent crime,4 ' health costs, and property damage are of
major concern to Americans. 42
A. HISTORIC OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND
The drug problem in the United States is anything but new,
as is the war on drugs. America has targeted opium, cocaine,
marijuana, and heroin, long before the militarized drug war of
the 1980's. The nation's first exposure to large scale drug
addition followed the Civil War (1861-1865), when thousands of
veterans returning home brought morphine addiction with
them. 43 Along with the 123,200 Chinese that immigrated to the
United States between 1860 and 1880, a substantial opium trade
flourished along the west coast. 44During the 1880's several
"4'Department of Justice, p. 136. Within the 1992 federal prison
population, over 50% of the inmates are drug offenders. State
prison populations range between 30-85% for drug offenders,
depending on the state. Drugs were related to between 76-84% of the
violent crimes committed in America.
42America's Place in the World: An Investigation of -the
Attitudes of American Opinion Leaders and the American Public about
International Affairs, Times Mirror Center for the People and the
Press, (Washington, D.C., November 1993), p. 20. Stopping drug
trafficking was the top priority international problem for the
American public surveyed (82%).
"43McWilliams, p. 8. Returning addicts were able to purchase
morphine at most mercantile stores, and the Sears Roebuck catalog
sold hypodermic kits.
"44Norman A. Graebner, Gilbert Fite, and Philip White,
A History of the American People, vol. II, (New York, 1971),
p. 646.
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beverage tonics contained cocaine, among them Coca-Cola, and
most pain elixirs on the market were filled with laudanum."•
At the turn of the century, the concern for narcotics
abuse grew and so did legislative efforts to control its
possession and use. In 1909, the Opium Exclusion Act was
passed and signed into law by President Roosevelt, limiting
the distribution and use of opiates among Chinese and Filipino
communities.46Further legislation was introduced by
Representative Francis Harrison (D-New York) in June 1913,
which culminated efforts to federally regulate the marketing
of opiates and cannabis derivatives.47lnitially, the Harrison
Narcotic Act was intended for drug regulation, and not for
drug enforcement purposes. However, the Supreme Court
decisions in the cases of Webb v. U.S., and U.S. v. Doremus,
modified the law making drug addition illegal."8
The subsequent outcome of these historic decisions created
a legal framework for further legislation which emphasized
"4David E. Musto, The American Disease: origins of Narcotic
Control, (New York, 1973), p. 3-9. Laudanum was a popular opiate
derivative used as a sedative.
"46Department of Justice, p. 80.
"
4McWilliams, p. 10. Introduced as H.R. 6282 and signed by
President Wilson March 1, 1915.
"4 Department of Justice, p. 79-82. Supreme Court Chief Justice
Edward D. White ruled that not only was drug addiction illegal, but
also prescribing any narcotic regulated under the Harrison Act
(1919).
19
enforcement and punishment. Incarceration, rather than
rehabilitation, was used to contain and reduce trafficking and
addiction to illegal drugs. 49 Numercus punitive laws were
passed: the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act of 1922; the
Uniform State Narcotics Act of 1932; the Marijuana Tax Act of
1937; the Opium Poppy Control Act of 1942; the Boggs Act of
1951; the Narcotics Control Act of 1956; the Drug Abuse
Control Act of 1965; and, the Controlled Substances Act of
1970. 50 Each of these laws expanded the legal parameters of
the Harrison Narcotics Act, and added harsher prison
sentences.5 1 All targeted enforcement of drug laws through
trafficking or addiction statutes, and in turn created the
need for new agencies to assist in controlling the perceived
increase of domestic drug abuse.
The formation of a special Narcotics Division within the
Treasury Department in 1920, eventually led to the creation of
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) in 1930, under the
49Douglas Clark Kinder, "Nativism, Cultural Conflict, Drug
Control: United States and Latin American Antinarcotics Diplomacy
through 1965," The Latin American Narcotics Trade and U.S. National
Security, ed. Donald J. Mabry, (New York, 1989), p. 20.
5 0Department of Justice, p. 81-84.
-
5 Kinder, p. 133. The Narcotics Control Act of 1956 provided
the following sentences for possession and trafficking; first
offense, two to ten years; second offense, five to twenty without
parole; third offense, ten to forty years without parole; for
selling heroin to a minor, the death sentence may be imposed.
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Hoover Administration. 2  The duties of the FBN were
transferred to the Department of Justice in 1963, and in 1968
the FBN was redesignated the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs (BNDD). The creation of the Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) in 1973 replaced the BNDD as the primary federal
law enforcement agency responsible for controlling the
supplies of illegal drugs. 3 Budgeting expenditures allocated
by Congress for the fight against illegal drugs escalated
yearly from $1,411,260 in 1930, to $11.7 billion in 1992.)
1. A New Approach
From the 1960's through the 1990's, the United States
firmly established itself as not only a major consumer of
illegal drugs, but also as the principal protagonist in
antidrug campaigns throughout the world. Historically, the
United States focused almost exclusively on domestic policy,
in terms of legislation and law enforcement, to curb drug
abuse. However, in 1971, the Nixon Administration began a
dramatic shift in policy initiated by antidrug operations in
"S2McWilliams, p. 13. Harry J. Anslinger became the first "drug
czar" from 1930 to 1962.
S3Department of Justice, p. 84. The DEA combined the efforts
of the BNDD, the Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement (ODALE), and
the Office of National Narcotics Intelligence (ONNI) created in
1972 under the Nixon Administration.
54Kinder, p. 137.
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Turkey, where an estimated 80 percent of the heroin purchased
in the United States originated."5
The operation involved $35 million in U.S. foreign aid
as incentive, which enabled Turkish (and BNDD)
counternarcotics units to significantly reduce the opium poppy
fields producing in Turkey. 6 Shortly after the eradication
efforts in Turkey, the heroin trade promptly expanded in the
"Golden Triangle" of Laos, Burma, and Thailand. Although
considered an overwhelming success by the Nixon Administration
and federal narcotics agencies, the production of heroin was
temporarily displaced, the supply pipeline was minimally
affected, and the demand was completely unaffected."7
The popularity of marijuana and heroin in the United
States during the later stages of the Vietnam War
significantly expanded the production of each in the northern
regions of Mexico. Concerned with what appeared to be a large
influx of heroin along the United States southern border, the
Ford Administration convinced Mexico's President Echeverria to
5 5McWilliams, p. 21.




allow poppy eradication in the form of aerial herbicidal
spraying.5s
In November, 1975, the United States and Mexico
conducted a two year joint operation search and destroy effort
against marijuana and opium fields located in the Sierra
Madres. The operation involved utilizing both law enforcement
and military assets, and emphasized eradication over
arrests.5 9 As with the effort in Turkey, the operation was
heralded a huge success; Mexico's share of the U.S. heroin
market shrank from 85 percent in 1974 to 37 percent in 1984;
marijuana declined from 90 percent in 1974 to 5 percent in
1981.60 Termed "Operation Condor I," the importance of the
exercise was that it provided the DEA with a tactical and
operational framework for future "source country eradication"
"
5 8Elaine Shannon, Desparados: Latin DruQ Lords, U.S. Lawmen.
and the War America Can't Win, (New York, 1988), p. 63-65. Initial
eradication efforts were performed manually by the Mexican Army,
which proved to be slow, labor intensive, and according to the DEA,
prone to corruptive influences. Aerial spraying provided several
advantages to eradication, importantly, it removed the face to face
encounters between police and traffickers.
5 9Shannon, p. 65.
"
6
°Richard B. Craig, "Mexican Narcotics Traffic: Binational
Security Implications," The Latin American Narcotics Trade and U.S.
National Security, ed. Donald J. Mabry, (New York, 1989),
p. 28. Unfortunately the effects were short lived, as growers
planted smaller fields in areas of limited aerial accessibility. By
1985, the heroin and marijuana production was at 1974 levels.
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efforts. The same eradication profiles were attempted in
Pakistan, Thailand, and Central American countries.
The decision of President Nixon in 1971 to eliminate
illegal drugs at the source, proved to be a watershed event in
the evolution of counternarcotics policies in the United
States. Since then, each administration has clearly
demonstrated a continued trend towards external enforcement
through interdiction and eradication programs. This profile is
not always well received in the political circles of Latin
America. According to one Latin American political analyst:
"This is because the Americans lack the social backbone to
deal with the problem within their own borders."'6 2
The strong antidrug campaign rhetoric of Ronald Reagan
during the 1980 presidential election year was certainly
directed towards Carter Administration support for
decriminalizing marijuana in 1977.63 Repeatedly through his
presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan cited evidence of a new
epidemic of drug abuse plaguing the country." The emergence
61Craig, p. 27-28.
"
62Edmu-dc' Morales, "The Political Economy of Cocaine
Production" iiatin American Perspectives, Issue 67, Vol. 17,
no. 4, Fall 1990.
63Musto, p. 266. Penalties for marijuana possession (personal




of cocaine in the early 1980's coincided with DEA reports of
drug smugglers using speedboats and low flying aircraft to
defeat U.S. Customs and Coast Guard efforts to stop them. 65
Cocaine was perceived to be omnipresent throughout the country
and, according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, law
enforcement was undermanned, overwhelmed, and outgunned."
As a result of a perceived drug epidemic and
significant rise in drug related crime, the Reagan
Administration emphasized increased legislation and financing
for federal counternarcotics agencies, which included the
military.6" Narcotics abuse and trafficking activities were
elevated to the Level of a national security threat, and there
was strong public support behind the anti-drug campaign. 6"
Several national opinion polls stated most Americans felt drug
abuse and related crime was a priority second only to the Cold
65Kathyrn Meyer, "Fast Crabs and Cigarette Boats: A Speculative
Essay," Drug Control Policy: Essays in Historical and Comparative
Perspective, ed. William 0. Walker III, (Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1992), p. 75-78.
"66Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Agency, Drug
Enforcement: Counterattack on Cocaine, vol. 9, no. 2, (Washington,
D.C., 1982), p. 1. Message from William H. Webster, Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
6 7Ronald J. Caffrey, Chief, Cocaine Investigations Section,
Drug Enforcement Agency, "The Strategy of Enforcement," Drucr
Enforcement: Counterattack on Cocaine, (DEA, 1982), p. 2-3.
6 8Bruce Michael Bagley, "The New Hundred Years War?: U.S.
National Security and the War on Drugs in Latin America," The Latin
American Narcotics Trade and U.S. National Security, ed. Donald J.
Mabry, (New York, 1989), p. 43.
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War. 69  Consequently, popular support manifested itself
through electing candidates who promised to pass "tough" drug
laws if elected. 7"
Major antidrug legislation began with the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, followed by the
Antidrug Abuse Act of 1986. As with previous legislation, both
targeted addicts, traffickers, money laundering, new "designer
drugs", and reestablished mandatory sentences of certain drug
related crimes."IUn addition, interdiction efforts were
increased and international enforcement programs were
expanded." To finance the new assault on drugs, Congress
allocated $3.9 billion to support agencies and operations
involved in the program.13
As the drug industry expanded so did increased
legislative efforts to curtail it. In 1988, the Antidrug Abuse
"
6 9Department of Justice, p. 85.
"
7
°McWilliams, p. 25-27. More vocal of the antinarcotics
proponents were; Rep. George W. Gekas (R-Pa.); Rep. Dave McCurdy
(D-Okla.); and, Sen. Alfonse D'Amato (R-N.Y.)
7 1Department of Justice, p. 86.
7 2Samuel I. del Villar, "Rethinking Hemispheric Antinarcotics
Strategy and Security," The Latin American Narcotics Trade and U.S.
National Security, ed. Donald J. Mabry, (New York, 1989), p. 110.
"Operation Blast Furnace" was a coca leaf eradication program in
Bolivia, financed under the auspices of the 1986 Antidrug Abuse
Act.
73Bruce Bagley, p. 46.
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Act passed by Congress, 74  stated one of the primary
objectives was a reduction in the tonnage of illegal drugs
smuggled into the United States. 75 To dramatically stem that
flow, Congress authorized and appropriated an annual $11.7
billion to federal agencies for combating drug smuggling and
abuse. Of the $11.7 billion, an estimated $8.1 billion would
be used to reduce the supply at the source, through
eradication and interdiction programs. The remaining $3.6
billion would be used for controlling the demand for narcotics
within the United States, with the bulk of the funding
utilized by state and domestic law enforcement. 76
The Antidrug Abuse Act of 1988 required the President
to formulate a national strategy for controlling drug abuse,
and narcotics trafficking. To facilitate this, the Office of
National Drug Control Policy was created in the Executive
Office, and coordinated an annual strategy to serve as a
framework for law enforcement efforts. President Bush revealed
"'
4Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Clear and Present
Dangers: The U.S. Military and the War on DruQs in the Andes,
(Washington, D.C., 1991), p. 76. Under the Antidrug Abuse Act of
1988, Congress assumed an active role in formulating international
narcotics policy and allocating resources.
7 5The Antidrug Abuse Act of 1988, Title VI, Subtitle C, Public
Law 100-690 of 1988, Congressional Record, House of
Representatives, 100th Congress, 2nd Session, vol. 134, HR 5120,
October 21, 1988.
"
76General Accounting Office, Drug Control, (Washington, D.C.,
September 1991), p. 4.
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the first National Control Drug Strategy on September 5,
1989.77 The strategy was directly related to the objectives
and goals outlined in the Antidrug Abuse Act of 1988, with
significant focus on Latin American countries producing
cocaine."7
Based on criminal activity statistics and arrests
indexes throughout the country which indicated the war on
drugs was being lost, more national resources were committed
to the problem. 79 Although initially resisted by the
Department of Defense (DoD), Congress sought to increase the
military's participation in the drug war. 80 The Defense
Authorization Act of 1989,81 substantially expanded the role
of the military in the national counternarcotics effort. The
"77"The President's Speech on National Drug Control Strategy,"
New York Times, September 6, 1989.
"'The White House, The National DruQ Control StrateQy,
(Washington, D.C., 1990).
"79Department of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice
Statistics- 1988, (Washington, D.C., 1989), p. 490-491.
80Donald J. Mabry, "The Role of the U.S. Military in the War
on Drugs," The Latin American Narcotics Trade and U.S. National
Security, ed. Donald J. Mabry, (New York, 1989), p. 75.
General Accounting Office, Drug Control: Issues SurroundinQ
Increased Use of the Military in Drug Interdiction, (Washington,
D.C., 1988), p.20-21. The military had been actively involved in
counternarcotics support since 1981.
81The National Defense Authorization Act of 1989, Public Law
100-456, H.R. 4481, September 29, 1989, ConQressional Record, House
of Representatives, 100th Congress, 2nd Session, vol. 134.
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law specifically designated the Department of Defense as the
lead agency for detecting and monitoring air and maritime
shipments of illegal drugs into the United States. It also
provided additional budget expenditures to supplement the
budget of the Department of Defense for implementing
policy. 82
As a result of counternarcotics operation conducted in
Latin America in the early 1980's, the DrucT Enforcement Agency
identified the Andean countries of Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia
as the primary sources of cocaine smuggled into the United
States. 83 Consequently, as domestic cocaine trafficking
increased over the decade, so did Congressional focus on
policy options to eradicate cocaine at its source. 84 This
ultimately led to the formulation of the Andean Strategy,
which was approved by President Bush in August, 1989. Although
82General Accounting Office, Drug Control: Defense SvendinQ for
Counternarcotics Activities for Fiscal Years 1989-1991,(Washington, D.C., April 1992), p. 18-20. The yearly appropriations
for DoD counternarcotics activities are; 1989- $300 million; 1990-
$450 million; 1991- $1.1 billion.
83Dominick L. DiCarlo, Assistant Secretary of State for
International Narcotics Matters, "International Initiatives to
Control Coca Production and Cocaine Trafficking," DruQ Enforcement:
Counterattack on Cocaine, Drug Enforcement Agency, (Washington,
D.C., 1982), p. 6-7.
84 United States Congress, House of Representatives, Cocaine
Production in the Andes, Hearing before the Select Committee on
Narcotics and Control, (Washington, D.C., June 7, 1989), p. 41.
Statement of Rep. Charles B. Rangel (R-N.Y.) on the need to
incorporate the individual items on the narcotics agenda into an
overall hemispheric strategy.
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the U.S. Congress debated the feasibility of supply reduction
and whether policy could significantly affect domestic drug
abuse, virtually every lawmaker agreed the problem was of
epidemic proportions and constituted a threat to national
security."5 Summing up the attitude prevalent in Congress,
Sam Nunn (D-Georgia), Chairman of the Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, said:
Logic and common sense tell us that stopping coca in
these valleys and countries may be far cheaper and more
effective than trying to do so once it arrives in the
United States. There are hundreds of thousands of street
corners in America where crack can be sold. But there is
only one Chapare and one Huallaga. There are over 12,000
miles of U.S. coastline for the trafficker to smuggle his
cocaine across, but there are only three countries where
he now buys most of his coca leaf. 86
B. THE ANDEAN DRUG STRATEGY
The second element of our strategy looks beyond
our borders, where the cocaine and crack, bought on
American streets, is grown and processed. 8"
- President George Bush
85Raphael Perl, "International Narcopolicy and the Role of the
U.S. Congress", The Latin American Narcotics Trade and U.S.
National Security, ed. Donald J. Mabry, (New York, 1989), p. 102.
86United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental
Affairs, Cocaine Production, Eradication, and the Environment:
Policy. Impact, and Options, (Washington, DC, August 1990), p. v.
87
"The President's Speech on National Drug Control Strategy,"
New York Times, September 6, 1989.
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The Andean Strategy is an overall U.S. counternarcotics
plan to combat cocaine production in Latin America. The
strategy was presented by President Bush during the Andean
Summit Meeting in Cartegena, Colombia, on February 15, 1990.
The initiative was signed by presidents of the three coca
producing nations of Latin America: Alan Garcia of Peru;"
Virgilio Barco of Colombia; and Jaime Paz Zamora of
Bolivia. 8 9 The goal of the initiative is coupled to the
National Drug Control Strategy goal of reducing the flow of
illegal drugs into the United States. The concept is based on
significant increases in military, law enforcement, and
economic aid to each signatory to increase efficacy in cocaine
eradication."
88Ronald Bruce St. John, The Foreign Policy of Peru, (Boulder,
1992), p. 212. Garcia was highly critical of the Andean Drug
Strategy, and U.S. Latin American policies in general. Garcia
refused to participate in the Cartegena Summit Meeting, and only
after the Bush Administration made foreign aid contingent upon
cooperation did Peru agree.
"
8 9United States Congress, House of Representatives, The Andean
Summit Meeting, February 15, 1990, Hearing before the Select
Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, (Washington, D.C., March
7, 1990), p. 31. Testimony of Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.
9 0United States Congress, Senate, U.S. International Drug
Policy- Multinational Strike Forces- Drug Policy in the Andean
Nations, Joint hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary,
(Washington, D.C., November 6, 1989, January 18, and March 27,
1990), p. 31-32.
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The strategy, simplified, has four fundamental
objectives:91
-To strengthen the political and institutional
capabilities of the Andean governments to enable them to
disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations;
-To increase the effectiveness of law enforcement and
security activities of the three countries against the cocaine
trade. This involves providing law enforcement andmilitary
assistance to enable them to fight the traffickers in the
remote and inaccessible areas in which drug production
activities often take place;
-To inflict significant damage to drug trafficking
organizations by working with these countries to disrupt and
dismantle the organizations;
-To strengthen and diversify legitimate economies of
Andean countries to overcome the destabilizing effects of
removing cocaine as a major source of income.92
91The White House, Office of the National Drug Control Policy,
The National DruQ Control Strategy, (Washington, D.C., 1991), p.
78-79.
92United States General Accounting Office, National Security
and International Affairs Division, The DruQ War: U.S. ProQrams in
Peru Face Serious Obstacles, Report to Congress, (Washington,DC
1991), p. 10.
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C. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS THROUGH 1992
The Andean Strategy is predicated on the concept that to
reduce the supply will in turn raise the market price to a
point demand is reduced. The economic theory of the strategy
is simple, however, it is the dynamic complexity of the
cocaine trade which prevents the functional application of the
strategy. It correctly assumes the demand for cocaine is
relatively constant, but incorrectly assumes the supply of
cocaine is a (inelastic) fixed amount. Therefore, the
structural flaw inherent in the strategy is the potential coca
supply is almost inexhaustible, and the large profit margin of
cocaine dealers allow for substantial loss of supply without
significantly impacting street prices. 93 Consequently, if
consumer cost of cocaine is not affected, there are no
economic costs incentives that will curb demand.
According to the 1992 estimates of the DEA, the Latin
American countries potentially produced between 955 and 1,170
metric tons of cocaine. The Peruvian portion of the estimate
"
9 3Michael Kennedy, Peter Reuter, and Kevin Jack Riley,
A Simple Economic Model of Cocaine Production, (Rand Corporation,
1993), p. 35. According to Kennedy, the cocaine trade could sustain
up to 70 percent loss of supply and have little impact on market
price.
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is 760 metric tons, or roughly 65 percent. 94 The DEA
estimates $100-140 billion annually is generated by the
cocaine trade. Approximately $80-90 billion remains within the
United States and $10-50 billion is channeled to cocaine
cartels and related support activities in Latin America. 9s
According to the DEA total 1992 worldwide cocaine seizures
were less than 100 metric tons, with Peru at 6.2 metric tons
(or less than 1 percent of the total) 96 This indicates the
eradication performance of Andean Strategy is well below the
level which would impact the cocaine price index, and
subsequent consumer demand.
Another factor to consider when analyzing the structural
objectives of the Andean Strategy, is the economic impact
within source countries involved with the cocaine trade. The
cocaine trade flourishes in areas which are remote, isolated,
and often in regions economically marginalized. Coca
eradication efforts have been violently resisted by rural
societies which depend on cocaine production for a livelihood.
94Drug Enforcement Agency, The National Narcotics IntelliQence
Consumers Committee Report 1992: The Supply of Illicit Drucrs to the
United States, (Washington, D.C., July 1993), p. 15. Estimate
includes only mature plants over two years old.
9sSimon Strong, Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in Peru,
(New York, 1992), p. 105.
96Drug Enforcement Agency, p. 16-18. Cocaine seizures for Latin
America in 1992 were (in metric tons); Peru- 6.2; Bolivia-6.8;
Columbia 95; Brazil-4.4; and, Ecuador-1.3.
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Using the official DEA estimates for coca leaf production and
ultimate cocaine yield, the following illustrates the
potential profits made from relative low risk investment. The
calculations are based on the potential coca production
estimates for Peru, at 500,000 acres.
500,000 acres of coca = 1015 pounds of leaf per acre
(this equates to 50,750,000 pounds annually)
50,750,000 pounds of coca leaf = 4,413,304 pounds paste
(based upon 345 pounds leaf to 3 pounds paste)
4,413,304 pounds of paste = 1,471,101 pounds base
(3 pounds paste to 1 pound base at $285. per pound)
1,471,101 pounds base X $285./pound = $4,192,635,000.97
The earning potential of cocaine production causes coca
growing within the Andean source countries to be a lucrative
cash crop. In several regions, coca growing is the only
economic alternative to poverty, and is certainly more of a
cash reality to the peasant than half hearted attempts at crop
substitution or subsidy programs.98
The Clinton Administration recently proposed a "controlled
shift" in policy which would redirect DoD resources from
"97Department of Justice, p. 42.
"
98U.S. General Accounting Office, The DruQ War: U.S. ProQrams
in Peru Face Serious Obstacles, (Washington, D.C., October 1991),
p. 19. The Agency for International Development has been attempting
variations on crop substitution since 1981, all of which have
failed to curb production.
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interdiction and more towards dismantling the cocaine networks
in source countries." Additionally, shortly after assuming
office, President Clinton appointed Lee Brown as director of
the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). Initially
Brown advocated a policy shift emphasizing education and
innovative rehabilitation programs to curtail domestic drug
abuse, a position also endorsed by the U.S. Attorney General,
Janet Reno.' 3 0 However, Brown recently met with Peruvian
President Fujimori, and pledged continued U.S. support for the
fight against drug production."'0  There have been no
alterations to the National Drug Control Strategy, the Andean
Drug Strategy has not been structurally modified by Congress
as yet, and coca eradication operations continue."'2
Assuming the current policy is maintained and further
implementation continues along the lines of increased
militarization of the drug war, what are the chances of
success? What is the internal condition of the state, and does
"Michael Isikoff, "New Approach to the Drug War Proposed," The
Washington Post, October 22, 1993.
"'°Michael Isikoff, "White House anti-drug policy to stress
treatment, prevention," The WashinQton Post, October 27, 1993.
01 1"U.S. Will Continue Working alongside Nations with the
Political Will to Fight Drugs," Comercio, (Lima, Peru), August 14,
1993, section A, p. 4.
112Corinne Schmidt-Lynch, "U.S. radar tracks drug traffickers'
flight over Peru: Operation Support Justice IV," The Washington
Post, vol. 116, section A, p. 36, February 18, 1993.
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the Peruvian government have the political will or means to
curb coca production? By applying the analytical framework
described, it will be apparent why the coca eradication effort
of the United States in Peru has marginal chances of success.
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III. THE SOVEREIGN STATE OF PERU
This population not only has been historically
marginalized by the state and by the westernized and
urban sector of the Peruvian society, but also by the
illicit expansion of the haciendas."°3
- Grover Pango Vildosos
Minister of Education (1985-1987)
Lima, Peru
It is questionable that Peru has ever had fully functional
internal sovereignty. National integration into the state
system has yet to be completed, and given the duration of
Peru's internal fragmentation, it remains doubtful in the
future. Although state sovereignty was first introduced by
Spanish Conquistadors and subsequently recognized by the
international community, internally, state authority extended
only as far as coercive force could extend. Throughout Peru's
history, functional sovereignty has been in a constant state
of marginalization, hindered by social stratification, ethnic
discrimination, economic inequities, and topographic
divisions."'
"..
3Grover Pango Vildoso, "Nationalism and Social Integration,"
APRA and the Democratic ChallenQe in Peru, ed. Eugenio Chang-
Rodriguez, (University of New York, 1988), p. 50.
104St. John, p. 230.
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Within the analytical framework described in section one,
the following concept would be applicable to the political
state of Peru:
Proposition 1- The state must be institutionally stronger
than the illegitimate activities. To be functionally sovereign
it must substantially raise the cost to operate higher than
the activity is willing to tolerate. The state must also
reduce the operating areas of the activity, and reestablish
the states rural institutional power base to maintain
sovereignty and prevent further marginalization of state
authority.
Therefore, an institutionally weak, politically
exclusionary regime is more prone to experience expansion of
illegal elements than a inclusionary democracy with strong
state institutions and effective administration. Political
inclusion embodies national integration, ethnic and
socioeconomic homogeneity, and functional political
participation. Most Latin American political systems can be
categorized within one of the four basic components to this
hypotheses;"1'
a) weak state institutions and politically exclusionary
(weak militaristic regimes);
105Karen Remmer, Military Rule in Latin America, (Westview
Press, Boulder, 1985), p.6-8.
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b) weak institutionally, but politically inclusionary
(developing or struggling democracies);
c) strong state institutions, politically exclusionary
(strong military regimes);
d) strong institutionally, with political inclusion
(strong democracies).
These propositions are graphically represented on TABLE 2.
An assessment value of low, medium, and high is associated
with each category which determines the efficacy and
functional strength of state institutions, which are
considered performance indicators of sovereignty. A low
category indicates the state is institutionally weak,
politically exclusionary and experiencing conditions which may
be conducive to illegitimate activities. A medium category is
neutral, but more dependent on coercive potential to extend
state sovereignty. This value would be applied to categories
A and D. The high category indicates institutionally strong
regimes which are either politically inclusive or
authoritarian, and capable of extending sovereignty through
the social and political fabric, thus reducing the operating
margin of illegitimate activities.
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TABLE 2
Political Systems and Institutions as Indicators of
Functional Sovereignty
A.) Weak institutions/ C.) Strong institutions/
political inclusion--medium political inclusion--high
B.) Weak institutions/ D.) Strong institutions/
political exclusion--low political exclusion--med/high
(source: Remmer)
Based on data examined in this section, Peru would be
categorized as a politically inclusionary system (for the last
13 years), with weak state institutions. An argument could
also be made contending Peru's political system has
historically been exclusionary, since most of the governments
were military regimes. In the case of Peru, the political
system is not as critical as the efficacy of its institutions,
or the performance of state infrastructures. Political
inclusion extends by constitutional law throughout the
country, but the centuries of exclusion by the ruling Spanish
elite have institutionalized political apathy in the rural
societies, and propagated social unrest.
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A. HISTORIC IMPEDIMENTS TO INTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY
The roots of feudalism are intact and they are
responsible for the lag in our capitalist
development.. .The agrarian and indian problem, which
the republic has not yet been able to solve, dominates
all other problems."'6
- Jose Carlos Mariategui,
Peruvian sociologist, 1928.
The valid picture of Peru is one of a small
privileged oligarchy, long unwilling to subordinate
itself to the building of a modern state, wholly
resistant to integrating the large Indian population
into the formal society, and now facing the prospect
of its own bloody demise at the hands of a brutal
revolutionary group."'
- Lieutenant General William Odom,
United States Army,
September 23, 1992
The erosion of Peruvian internal sovereignty has its roots
in the historic development of the state. First, the
conquering Spanish imported a feudal hacienda system and class
structure which did not address or facilitate national
106Jose Carlos Mariategui, Seven Interpretive Essays on
Peruvian Reality, translated by Marjory Urquidi, (University of
Texas Press, 1971), p. 34.
1 0 7United States Congress, House of Representatives, The
Shining Path After Guzman: The Threat and the International
Response, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 102nd
Congress, September, 23, 1992, (Washington, D.C., 1992), p. 12.
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integration."°8 The indigenous population was segregated,
regarded as ethnically inferior to the Spanish, and legally
regulated to subservient position. Second, since the
foundations of the national polity were rooted in feudalism,
the institutions of the state subsequently produced social
stratification, ethnic discrimination, and economic inequities
between entrenched Spanish European elites and the indigenous
populations. These cleavages became institutionalized and
manifested through the split between urban-industrial coastal
areas and rural-agrarian sierra highlands."9 Third, the
geographic divisions in Peru further exacerbate the racial,
cultural and economic divisions in the country by physically
sectioning the country in half. Each of these will be more
closely examined in the following section.
1. Colonialism and National Integration
In the aftermath of Francisco Pizarro's conquest of
Peru (1532-1533), was the formation of the Viceroyalty of
Peru, with its colonial seat in Lima."1 ' The subsequent
10 8Stanley J. Stein, and Barbara H. Stein, The Colonial
Heritage of Latin America, (Oxford University Press, 1970),
p. 35-37.
109McClintock, Cynthia," Peru: Precarious Regimes,
Authoritarian and Democratic", Democracy in Developing
Countries, (Boulder, 1989), p. 335.
"'James D. Rudolph, Peru: The Evolution of a Crisis, (Hoover
Institution Press, 1992), p. 22-24.
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pclitical system established was an exact replica of the
Spanish colonial system throughout Latin America. It was a
feudalistic system based on the rapid exploitation of natural
resources acquired through forced labor of indigenous
populations."' These resources, in turn, filled the coffers
of Spain and funded further extensions of the colonial empire
and sovereignty.
The soldiers and servants of the Spanish Crown
participating in the conquest, were rewarded with land and
labor grants in the form of "encomiendas" (indian labor)1 1 2
and "haciendas" (land) for service to the Crown."' This
feudalistic system amounted to annexation of the indigenous
population and tribal properties into the political, economic,
and judicial framework of New Spain. Consequently, virtually
any penetration of native Indian societies was for purely
economic purposes, and not designed to nurture national
integration."'
"'Magnus Morner, "Rural economy and society in Spanish South
America," Colonial Spanish America, ed. Leslie Bethell, (Cambridge
University Press, 1987), p. 287-291.
112Rudolph, p. 25. Initially, there were 500 encomiendas
established in Peru.
"13Benjamin Keen, A History of Latin America, (Princeton,
1992), p. 81.
1 14 Julio Colter, "Democracy and National Integration," The
Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered, ed. Cynthia McClintock and
Abraham F. Lowenthal, (Princeton University Press), p. 4.
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Initially, a number of Indians violently resisted
enslavement by the Spanish, but eventually most were caught,
forcibly pacified, and fragmented into small communities
called "reducciones." The relocation of the Indians into
reducciones opened more tribal lands to the crown, provided
additional labor units, and extended state authority over
territory and population.1 15 The political and economic
institutions established during the Spanish colonialism period
have remained structurally intact, in various forms,
throughout the history of Peru.-16
The paradox created by Peru's feudal system, was the
controlling elites in Lima were able to systematically develop
external sovereignty without integrating the indigenous
society into the political framework, and also without
extending functional state control past the coastal areas. The
state of Peru operated as a political and legislative island
in the city of Lima, and was surrounded by millions of
"15David Scott Palmer, Peru: the authoritarian tradition, (New
York, 1980), p. 14.
"16Colin Harding, "Land Reform and Social Conflict in Peru,"
The Peruvian Experiment: Continuity and Chanqe under Military Rule,
ed. Abraham F. Lowenthal, (Princeton University Press, 1975), p.
221.
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apathetic Indian societies which maintained their distance
from the Spanish invaders."'
In these terms, the state of Peru was constructed
externally inward, and from the top down. This perpetuated an
image of sovereignty, which from a internal perspective has
remained dysfunctional and marginalized throughout rural Peru.
National integration applied only to the oligarchy, the urban
merchant classes, and landowners. For centuries the system
remained politically exclusionary, and only opening when
absolutely forced. The slow incorporation of indigenous and
rural societies into the political fabric was more a function
of economics than a true concern of integration."1 '
2. Socioeconomic and Ethnic Divisions
Peru evolved into a polarized society, with Spanish
elites controlling Indian based labor which supported an
export economy of natural resources. Centuries of economic
domination by non-Indian superiors over Indian subordinates
"
117j. H. Elliot, "The Spanish Conquest," Colonial Spanish
America, ed. Leslie Bethell, (Cambridge University Press, 1987),
p. 54. Many of the Indian societies retreated inland to escape
enslavement, and diseases brought by the Spanish.
"'Alain Rouquie, The Military and the State in Latin America,
(University of California Press, 1987), p. 34-35.
Larry Diamond, and Juan J. Linz, "Politics, Society, and
Democracy in Latin America", Democracy in Developing Countries:
Latin America, vol. 4, (Boulder, 1989), p. 9.
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created a "dual society" permeated by mutual distrust and
alienation." 9 Historically, Indian societies have been
resistent to political and social incorporation into the
mainstream of the Peruvian state, largely due to economic
exploitation and exclusion."12 Indian labor provided the
oligarchy with the means to gain economic prosperity by
working the mines, plantations, and other industries which
were labor intensive. 121
Income distribution was directly related to land, with
ownership extremely unequally sided towards the oligarchic
elite.' 2 2 The land and labor grants established by the
encomienda and hacienda systems eventually placed over 75
percent of Peru's agricultural lands under the ownership of
less the .05 percent of the population.' 23 These systems
became formal legal institutions which propagated social and
economic stratification, and intensified polarization of
indigenous communities from the national polity in Lima.
"'
1 Palmer, p. 11.
"'
2
°Timothy Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin
America, (Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 136.
121Cynthia McClintock, Peasant Cooperatives and Political
ChanQe in Peru, (Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 72.
122Rudolph, p. 10. Most of Peru's arable landholdings were
owned by forty-four families within the oligarchy.
123Masterson, p. 6.
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Deprived of traditional property holdings, Indian
societies (and eventually mestizo peasants) were economically
and legally bound to perform labor on the haciendas, or in the
mines.-12 As market industries formed, the oligarchy
controlled the markets, reaped the profits, and dictated
working conditions, while the lower classes supplied the
labor. These institutional parameters retarded the expansion
of capitalism into the rural regions of Peru, and widened
economic cleavages within society.
Centuries later, the system created by the Spanish has
evolved into institutional and functional variation of the
"apartheid" system found in South Africa, without the legal
codification."2 ' By the 1960's, the inequality of income
distribution resulted in 53 percent of the national income
being earned by the upper one-tenth of society.' 2 6  The
decayed foundations of the Peruvian political system have
initiated a gradual collapse of the state into itself. The
continued decline of the economy has brought social activism,
124Robert G. Wesson, Democracy in Latin America: Promise and
Problems, (Hoover Institution Press, 1982), p. 127.
12'John P. Merrill, Special Assistant for Latin America, Policy
Planning Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, DruQs vs.
Democracy: Reconciling Counternarcotics and Counterinsurgency
Obiectives- A Case Study of Contemporary Peru, (Washington, D.C.,
July 21, 1993), p. 18.
126A. Javier Hamann, "The Peruvian Economy: Characteristics and
Trends," Peru's Path to Recovery: A Plan for Economic Stabilization
and Growth, ed. Carlos Paredes, (Washington, D.C., 1991), p. 53.
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and a prospering black market. Per capita income has been in
steady decline since 1974, and by 1991 Peru was considered on
of the poorest countries in Latin America, second only to
Haiti.127
Compounding the issue of income inequity, the Peruvian
economy has experienced a negative growth rate in gross
domestic products since 1968, and the foreign debt is over $21
billion.128 In 1990, underemployment was 85 percent, average
real wages were half that of 1983, and the consumer price
index for food inflated 7000 per cent in one year.129
Performance indicators of state institutional
strength, such as internal social services, state investment,
and administrative infrastructure, continue to recess
throughout Peru. Although historically marginal to begin with,
the statistical trend of government expenditures has been
centered around Lima, and coastal urban areas.131 Serious
127"Basic Human Needs and the Democratic Process in Latin
America," North-South Issues: Democratization, vol. 2, no. 2,
(Miami, 1993), p. 6-8.
12 8Saba, p. 103.
129United Nations, Economic Survey of Latin America and the
Caribbean: 1990, (United Nations Publication, 1992), p. 381-405.
According to per capita standards, approximately 75-80 percent of
Peru's population is considered poor.
1 3°Slater, p. 188. For the 1969-1980 period, Lima received 38.4
percent of the budget for housing and construction, 37 percent of
the education budget, and 68 percent of the labor and social
security budget.
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attempts to reverse social and economic polarization during
the Velasco Regime (1968-1975) were inadequately funded and
consequently lost momentum. Any further efforts at national
integration were dramatically influenced by social unrest and
the emergence of insurgent behavior.
Public health services remain unavailable to over half
the population as a whole, but are especially critical in the
rural regions. In 1990, over 73 percent of the country's
doctors were in Lima, which left one doctor to every 29,000
inhabitants in the rural areas. In the department of Ayacucho,
the birthplace of the Shining Path in 1980, there were 30
doctors for 543,000 inhabitants.13 Consequently, infant
mortality was 150 percent higher in the rural regions than in
Lima.
Electricity, sewage, and potable water remains
unavailable to approximately 80 percent of the rural sierra
population, despite the construction of the Mantaro hydro-
electric project in Huancavelica.1 32 Inadequate sanitation
and water treatment produced a recent cholera epidemic which
has infected more than 130,000 Peruvians.13 Funding for
1 3 1Slater, p. 213. Additionally, Ayacucho received a total of
0.6 percent of state investment for 1980.
1 32Slater, p. 172-174.
133 Paredes, P. 321.
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education decreased 67 percent between 1970 and 1988, and
current allocation per student is approximately $220 (US).
The infrastructure of transportation and roads remains
inadequate, with only 10 percent of the roads paved. The
highway system, secondary roads, and railway system are in
poor material condition and inadequate for the population.
Transportation into the interior in almost non-existent,
either because the Shining Path insurgents control access or
since only 12 percent of the roads are in usable
condition."'
State revenues obtained from overall personal income
tax declined in the period from 1977-1988, but were almost
non-existent in the rural departments, especially in areas
with high levels of social unrest.135 As a result, state tax
collectors have refused to enter departments and provinces
which sustain insurgent activity because of the probability of
execution. This ultimately forces the state to absorb the lost
revenues elsewhere, which it has done through devaluation of
134Hamann, p. 47.
13 5Luis Alberto Arias, "Fiscal Policy," Peru's Path to
Recovery: A Plan for Economic Stabilization and Growth, ed. Carlos
E. Paredes, (The Brookings Institute, 1991), p. 210.
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currency, increased sales tax, and cuts in capital
investments."16
Socioeconomic polarization has historically been
reinforced by, and coupled to, the ethnic cleavages which are
prevalent throughout the country. Peru's population at the
time of the Spanish Conquest was estimated between six and
nine million, with 95-100 percent of the population listed as
Indian. 137 The last population census, conducted in 1990,
listed Peru's population at 22 million, with a growth rate of
2.5 percent (500,000 per year).
The ethnic divisions were: 45 percent Indian; 37
percent mestizo; 15 percent white; and, 3 percent black and
Asian. 13 ' The indigenous population is not only physically
and culturally distinct from the urban whites, but speaks a
separate language as well. Additionally, over 60 percent of
the population resides in the rural regions and small urban
areas. Virtuaily all the whites live in Lima and the
surrounding area, with few residing within the interior
regions. The official state language was Spanish until 1979,
when the new constitution added the indigenous language of
13 6Javier Abugattas, "The Social Emergency Program," Peru's
Path to Recovery: A Plan for Economic Stabilization and Growth, ed.
Carlos E. Paredes, (The Brookings Institute, 1991), p. 141.
13 Palmer, p. 15.
138Masterson, p. 5-6.
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Quechua."3 9 The ethnic divisions in Peruvian society, indian,
mestizo, and white, are reinforced by language differences,
cultural segregation, and the economic disparities between
urban and rural.
3. Geographic Boundaries
The geography of Peru has presented substantial
obstacles in the development of the state, and the subsequent
extension of sovereignty. The country is roughly twice the
size of Texas, but only six percent of the land is suitable
for agricultural purposes."4 ' Peru is divided into three
distinct topographic regions: the coastal plains, which
includes Lima; the sierra highlands; and the sparsely
inhabited selva (Amazon jungle). Natural resources include:
copper; silver; lead; zinc; iron; petroleum; rubber; and
fisheries.
The Andean mountain range forms the nucleus of the
sierras, with peaks over 20,000 feet, and extending the length
of Peru. The sierras account for 45 percent of the nation's
population and 30 percent of the territory.141 Of the 6000
13'Rudolph, p. 11.
"'
4 Hamann, p. 42.
14 1Rudolph, p. 5. The selva comprises 60 percent of Peru's
territory, and 10 percent of the population, most of which reside
in the fertile valleys on the east slopes of the Andean Range.
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indigenous communites in Peru, 5000 reside in the Andes." 42
Although large in size, only 4.5 percent of the total area in
the sierra region is suitable for farming.1 43 Historically
the cultural lotus for the Inca civilizations, administrative
departments in the sierras have been consistently at the
bottom of the scale for state investment and development for
the last twenty years.144
B. PERFORMANCE OF POLITICAL REGIMES 1968-1993
The root of all these problems is the weakness of
the state--the absence of an administrative capacity
to provide law and order, to provide minimal public
services and to prevent dramatic corruption within the
bureaucracies.145
- Lieutenant General William Odom,
United States Army,
September 23, 1992
Since gaining independence from Spain in 1820, two thirds
of all the presidents in Peru have been military dictators.
More than half of the individuals occupying the presidency
142Palmer, p. 9.
143Rudolph, p. 5. The altiplano (high plateau) and puna
grasslands in the sierras sustain limited grazing for llama and
sheep, but soils are not favorable to farming.
144Slater, p. 167. The departments of Apurimac, Ayacucho, Puno,
Junin, and Pasco ranked at the bottom of state investment per
capita, per annum for 1969-1980.
145United States Congress, House of Representatives, The
Shining Path After Guzman: The Threat and the International
Response, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 102nd
Congress, September, 23, 1992, (Washington, D.C., 1992), p. 12.
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used military force to gain the office.' 46  Peruvian
democracy, when it exists, has been historically fragile and
highly susceptible to military takeover during times of actual
or perceived state crisis."' Any political agenda was to be
executed within the parameters established by the oligarchic
elites, and the cost of failure was prompt removal from
office.' 4 8 This may be of significance to the United States
when analyzing the probability of success for the Andean Drug
Strategy, against the possibility of democratic breakdown in
the country.
1. The Military Regimes 1968-1980
The political watershed to the current internal
conditions in Peru occurred in 1968, when military elites
seized control of the government in an effort to prevent
social mobilization from gaining momentum in the countryside.
The military coup of 1968 was a political watershed based on
the reforms proposed in its socioeconomic agenda, and because
the military reacted as an institution against the oligarchic
system it held responsible for national polarization. Although
146Raul P. Saba, Political Development and Democracy in Peru:
Continuity in ChanQe and Crisis, (Boulder, 1987), p. 36.
"'
4 Gordon McCormick, The ShininQ Path and the Future of Peru,
(Rand Corporation, 1990), p. 41.
148Slater, p. 76-78.
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it was a bold attempt to achieve integration, ultimately the
effort lost support and the military was discredited. From
1968 to 1980 Peru was under the military dictatorships of
General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975) and General
Francisco Morales Bermudez (1975-1980).
a. General Velasco Alvarado 1968-1975
The success of the Cuban Revolution in 1959,
literally shook the Western Hemisphere. Not since the Mexican
Revolution has one event had such ramifications on Latin
America. Fidel Castro and Che Guevara seemed to represent the
radical alter entity of legal reformists which were successful
in Bolivia (1952), and Guatemala (1954). The Cuban Revolution
provided the blueprint to social revolutionaries in several
Latin American countries seeking to overthrow feudalistic
political systems. Peru's decayed internal conditions, and
entrenched political apathy in rural regions, made it a
country ripe for revolution.' 4 9
Consequently, two separate guerrilla groups formed
in the sierras during 1965, and were perceived by President
Fernando Belaunde-Terry (1963-1968) to be the start of mass
social mobilization. Both guerrilla groups, the Army of
National Liberation (ELN), and the Movement of the
149Thomas C. Wright, Latin America in the Era of the Cuban
Revolution, (New York, 1991), p. 119.
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Revolutionary Left (MIR), were unorganized, poorly equipped,
and since they were considered "outsiders" had very limited
success in obtaining rural support.' 5 °
The impact of these groups was not from the actual
threat to the state as neither group was ever a significant
political of military threat. Rather, it was the perceived
threat, which was based on the explosive potential of the
countryside, that caused tremendous concern to the state.
Military officers involved in counterinsurgency operations
witnessed the social conditions in the some of the poorest
regions of Peru, and understood the implications of
socioeconomic disparity to internal security."'5 As a result,
the military coalesced to an idea of massive social reforms,
especially focused in the sierras.152
Frustrated with attempts to move the Belaunde-
Terry Administration towards sweeping reforms,' 53 military
progressives organized a junta around the leadership of
"'S°Wickham-Crowley, p. 332. Most of the participants of the
guerrilla groups were students or teachers from urban areas.
... Marcial Rubio Correa, "The Armed Forces in Peruvian
Politics," Democracy Under Siege: New Military Power in Latin
America, ed. Augusto Vargas, (New York, 1989), p. 37.
152Wright, p. 121-122.
15'Rudolph, p. 197. The military was also bitterly opposeO -o
the concessions Belaunde-Terry had made with the U.S. f r'+,
International Petroleum Company, which the Kennedy Administration
made contingent to military aid.
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General Juan Velasco Alvarado. The "Revolutionary Government
of the Armed Forces" assumed power on October, 3, 1968, in a
bloodless coup against President Belaunde-Terry.15 4 Congress
was dissolved and elected municipal officials removed.
The regime focused on social reforms designed to
reverse the economic stagnation throughout the country.
Especially targeted were the rural districts where government
presence was marginal, state institutions were weak, and
conditions were perceived as conducive to guerrilla support
and recruitment. In an attempt to reduce foreign dependency,
Velasco focused on expropriating several of the 300 U.S. owned
firms operating in Peru which accounted for two thirds of the
foreign investment."'
Most of the reforms had enormous popular support,
especially in the rural departments, but fell short of the
intended goals primarily because of limited resources devoted
to departments outside Lima and Cuzco. Velasco expropriated
the interests of Exxon Corporation, W.R. Grace Company,
International Telephone and Telegraph, and Chase Manhattan
Bank, but as a result the United States shut off valuable
foreign aid which the government could have applied to
154Rudolph, p. 198.
... Rudolph, p. 55.
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financing its proposed social reforms." 6 Peru also lost loan
guarantees from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and was
forced to borrow from private banking interests to service its
foreign debt. The aggregate result of higher interests and
limited economic expansion quadrupled the foreign debt to $3
billion.1 "7
The centerpiece of the Velasco government was the
Agrarian Reform Law of 1969. Although proposed to alleviate
the gross inequity in land distribution and therefore reduce
the potential of increased social tension in the sierras, the
law was first applied to break up large coastal plantations
owned by families in the oligarchy.' 5 8 Land was assimilated,
and redistributed in agricultural collectives managed by the
state. Agrarian reform in the sierras followed similar
reorganization, and by 1977 most of the large haciendas were
transformed into peasant cooperatives providing land to
400,000 of the 4 million inhabitants (10 percent) . Some
departments, such as Junin and Ayacucho, experienced little or
..
6Harold Molineu, U.S. Policy Toward Latin America. (Boulder,
1990), p. 108-110. Under the 1962 Hickenlooper Amendment, all U.S.
foreign aid will be terminated to any country failing to compensate
fairly for expropriated assets.
15'Hamann, p. 65.
158Cynthia McClintock, Peasant Cooperatives and Political
Chanqe, (Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 48.
59
no land redistribution, and consequently social tensions
remained high in those areas."9
Ultimately, the state resources required to
successfully operate the cooperatives, such as tractors,
fertilizers, seed, were channeled to other development
projects in coastal areas, and agricultural production in the
sierras decreased. 160 As the economy declined, so did actual
and proposed state social services in the sierras. The attempt
at large scale agrarian reform, which became convoluted over
time, successfully raised the social awareness level of the
peasantry and exacerbated already volatile conditions. Within
a few years, the institutional decay of the state, combined
with a high perception of social inequity, would impact Peru
with a vengeance.
b. General Morales Bermudez 1975-1980
In 1975 the Peruvian economy was in extremely poor
condition, largely from an unprecedented increase in military
spending."6 Mass labor strikes, political protests, and fear
of renewed insurgency actions in the countryside fueled a
1 5 9Wickham-Crowley, p. 127-128.
16 0Harding, p. 252.
16 1Rudolph, p. 204. Peru's military expenditures increased 82
percent between 1968-1977, compared to the GNP which rose by 40
percent.
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split in the military elite which forced Velasco out of
office. His prime minister, General Francisco Morales
Bermudez, assumed power on August 29, 1975. Congress was
reactivated, and national elections were scheduled for 1980.
By 1978 the foreign debt had reached $7.2 billion,
an amount equal to 44 percent of Peru's gross national
product, and the debt service was consuming 31 percent of the
export earnings.' 6 2 While Morales Bermudez attempted to
reverse the economic decline through austerity measures
imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), conditions
deteriorated.
The austerity package, similar to the measures
introduced by President Fujimori in 1990, had a devastating
impact on the economic condition of lower income groups in
Peru (or roughly 70 percent of the population). Accepting
these conditions also severely damaged the marginal support of
the Morales Bermudez government, and thoroughly discredited
the military's ability to govern. The United States reinstated
foreign aid to Peru since the issue with Exxon had been
resolved, but even large influxes of foreign aid could not
alter the plunge of the Peruvian economy.
Shortly after assuming office, Morales Bermudez
terminated several of the Velasco social reforms, including
162Rudolph, p. 202.
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the Agrarian Reform Law of 1969. Peasant cooperatives were
dissolved, and in some cases land was returned to the hacienda
owner.' 63 The currency was devalued more than 50 percent, and
real wages dropped to 55 percent of 1973 level.'"
Designed to improve Peru's balance of payments, it
tremendously impacted the lower class, and hourly wage
workers. Buying power for food, already at bare minimums for
most Peruvians, was effectively cut in half. This resulted in
renewed social unrest, intense labor strikes throughout the
urban areas, and to a reemergence of insurgent activity in the
sierras. Arrests and repression aggravated the situation, and
protests amplified. Several nation wide strikes by union
workers, teachers, and students occurred between 1977-
1979. 16
Citing insurgent activity in the departments of
Junin and Ayacucho as justification, Morales Bermudez
initiated a campaign of repression similar to Argentina's
"
63Masterson, p. 254.
"'Cynthia McClintock, "Peru: Precarious Regimes, Authoritarian
and Democratic," Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America,
p. 351.
16'Philip Mauceri, "Nine Cases of Transitions and
Consolidations," Democracy in the Americas: StoppinQ the Pendulum,
ed. Robert Pastor, (New York, 1989), p. 233.
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counterinsurgency campaign in the 1970's."'5 Rural regions
were targeted, troops were mobilized, and consequently the
state perceived itself of having reduced the ranks of
suspected guerrillas.
Instead of extending internal sovereignty, the
counterinsurgency underscored the institutional and structural
weakness of the state throughout the rural regions, and
claimed the lives of thousands of Indian "neutrals".
Overreaction by the state to social unrest, brought about by
its own neglect, increased polarization and autonomy in the
rural departments. The cumulative effect of the
counterinsurgency program was an increase of human rights
abuses and a net decrease in functional sovereignty. As news
of this "dirty war" was relayed by Amnesty International, the
human rights violations of the Morales Bermudez regime caused
President Carter to suspend foreign aid to the country.16
7
Unable to resolve the internal social and economic
tension, coupled with the pressure applied by the
116David Rock, Authoritarian Argentina, (University of
California Press, 1993), p. 224. Similar to Peru's "State of
Emergency" which suspends constitutional rights in certain zones of
the state, Argentina enacted measures which enabled the security
forces extreme latitude in the use of kidnapping, torture and
murder.
"
6 7Timothy Wickham-Crowley, Exploring Revolution, (New York,
1992), p.72.
Benjamin Keen, History of Latin America, (Boston, 1992),
p.401
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international community, Morales Bermudez effectively turned
over the government to the leading party of newly elected
National Constituent Assembly, July 28, 1978.168 A new
constitution was ratified the following year, which provided
the right to vote to all Peruvians, and lifted the literacy
requirements which effectively prevented political
participation of the Indian population. :69
The significance of the Morales Bermudez regime,
was the termination of the progressive movement within the
military, reversed agrarian reform measures, and a return to
democratic rule. It also marked the end to a consolidated
effort by the military institution to forcibly effect social
changes in the sierra, and facilitate national integration.
Consequently, any gains made towards establishing internal
sovereignty were lost as government interest and investment in
the region became refocused elsewhere.
2. Redemocratization: 1980-1993
The loss of popular support, socioeconomic crisis, and
a threat to its institutional legitimacy, forced the military
to allow a return to civilian rule. The national elections of
168Correa, p. 40.
'
6 9Masterson, p. 266. In terms of attempting political
integration of polarized indigenous groups, this was monumental
legislation.
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1980 began another phase of constitutional democracy in Peru.
Political inclusion allowed previously outlawed parties to
reemergence and campaign. However, the continued decline in
state efficacy and performance created political space for
organized opposition, but years of political instability had
prevented legitimate parties from consolidating and
institutionalizing.
As state sovereignty continued to marginalize in the
rural departments, two insurgent groups, the Shining Path and
Tupac Amaru, formed and began to consolidate support. During
this period the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) began its
"Popular War" against the government."7 ' Peru's last elected
president, Fernando Belaunde Terry (deposed by the military in
1968), was returned by popular vote in 1980, and inherited an
economy in ruin with a growing rural insurgency in the
shadows."'7
a. Fernando Belaunde Terry 1980-1985
Belaunde Terry continued previous austerity
measures, emphasized debt repayment and pushed for expansion
of the export trade. The foreign debt climbed from $9 billion
"'
7 Gordon McCormick, The Shining Path and the Future of Peru,
(Rand Corporation, 1990), p. 15.
"'
1Richard Craig, "Illicit Drug Traffic: Implications for South
American Source Countries", Journal of Interamerican Studies and
World Affairs, Fall 1989, p. 11.
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to $11 billion by 1982, and the inflation index increased
3000 percent. The currency lost 80 percent of its real
purchasing value during the first year of the
administration."7 Labor strikes throughout the country,
totalled 670 and resulted in an estimated loss of 18.5 million
man hours. 173 Unemployment approached 30 percent, and
underemployment reached 70 percent, which combined with the
staggering consumer price index to intensify social
unrest. 74
Political violence and the subsequent
counterinsurgency in the rural areas, created a steady
migration of displaced peasants into the urban areas. This in
turn added to the problems which faced the government as
peasants began to settle in the shantytowns around Lima in
search of jobs or escaping the escalating violence in the
countryside.1 7 5 The unwillingness of the state to provide
adequate social services into this area provided the Shining
Path with ideal conditions for insurgent recruitment.' 76
'
72Hamann, p. 71.




76Gordon H. McCormick, From the Sierra to the Cities: The
Urban Campaign of the Shining Path, (Rand Corporation, 1992),
p. 9.
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To complicate Belaunde Terry's internal troubles,
the Reagan Administration declared a war on drugs, and part of
it was aimed at Peru. During the early 1980's, cocaine abuse
and related violence was perceived to be out of control in the
United States and Congress began to react. DEA personnel had
identified drug networks and cocaine producing regions, and
requested eradication efforts be directed at reducing coca
crops in Peru.' 77 Under substantial pressure from the Reagan
Administration, Belaunde Terry agreed to a joint operation
conducted along the Andean ridge to ascertain the extent of
the coca growing regions.178
Large areas were targeted by the DEA for
eradication inside Peru, but the cumulative effects of
sovereignty marginalization had provided the insurgents room
for expansion and territorial control. The Belaunde Terry
government maintained the Sendero insurgency was entrenched in
the rural areas, and impeded coca eradication efforts. The
actions of the Tupac Amaru and Sendero, combined together
1 7 7Scott MacDonald, Mountain HiQh, White Avalanche, (New York
1989), p. 61.
"
78Jose E. Gonzales, "Guerrillas and Coca in the Upper Huallaga
Valley," The Shining Path of Peru, ed. David Scott Palmer, (New
York, 1992), p. 123.
United States Congress, House of Representatives, Operation
Snowcap: Past, Present, and Future, Hearing before the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, May, 23, 1990, (Washington, D.C., 1990), p. 8.
Testimony of David Westrate, Assistant Administrator for
Operations, Drug Enforcement Administration.
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caused Belaunde Terry to declare a "state of emergency" in 19
of the 23 provinces."7 9
Additionally, the eradication program posed an
economic threat to a large segment of the rural peasantry. The
military feared that destroying the livelihood of the coca
growing peasant would in turn enhance support of the
insurgents. The DEA suspected the Peruvian police in the areas
were corrupted by the coca trade and reluctant to participate
in eradication efforts."8 '
b. Alan Garcia 1985-1990
The peaceful turnover of government between
Belaunde Terry and Alan Garcia was the first democratic
transfer since 1954, and one of the few decided by national
election in Peru's history.181 Unfortunately, by the time
Alan Garcia obtained a landslide victory over Belaunde and
minor rivals in 1985, internal sovereignty was severely
'"Philip Mauceri, "The Military, Insurgency, and Democratic
Power: Peru 1980-1988," Papers on Latin America, (Columbia
University, 1989), p. 25. Under Article 231 of the 1979
Constitution, key elements of a State of Emergency are:
Presidential decree; valid for 60 days unless renewed by the
Executive; establishes the military as the absolute state
authority; and, suspends all constitutional guarantees, except
voting.
18°Sam Dillon, "Corrupt Troops Aid Peru Drug Trade," Miami
Herald, December 31, 1990.
18 1Palmer, p. 37.
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threatened. The coca trade had multiplied exponentially with
an increased demand in the U.S., and was firmly established as
a illegitimate activity operating in regions outside
functional state control. The Sendero insurgency had
consolidated its support base, expanded rapidly, and was
openly operating in several departments with marginal state
control."82
Almost immediately, Garcia announced he would
limit interests payments on foreign debt to 10 percent of
Peru's export earnings in order to impede capital outflow and
rejuvenate the economy. Peru's debt servicing consumed 60
percent of the export earnings, which left little to finance
government administrations, programs, or subsidies.183
Initially, economic conditions improved, the annual rate of
inflation dropped from 200 to 70 percent and real wages
increased 10 percent.1 8
In the urban areas, economic conditions improved
slightly for a brief period. However, in the countryside the
peasantry remained locked in a permanent state of poverty.
182Simon Strong, Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in Peru,
(New York, 1992), p. 94.
"
83Luis Negreiros Criado, President of the Chamber of Deputies
(1985-1986), "The Aprista Generation and the relations to
Government and Party in Today' s Peru," APRA and the Democratic




There were no farm relief programs, crop subsidies, or welfare
programs. Schools were scarce, hospitals almost non-existent,
and government administrative functions did not extend outside
department capitals. State social aid programs designed to
provide some relief to the peasants, were ineffective, and
equipment remained in the cities.1 8s Hourly wage paying jobs
in rural departments were rare, and most peasants were
unemployed. Government infrastructure did not exist other than
an occasional policeman or tax collector, if at all.' 86 When
the peasant farmer had a legal problem or required medical
help, he was forced to travel into the urban areas. In the
countryside, Peruvian sovereignty, if it existed at all, was
more a frame of mind than a functional reality.
Within the political economy of the rural
departments, concerns and needs of the peasantry were
addressed by the Senderistas.1'8 Government neglect caused
sovereignty to marginalize, and counterstate institutions and
organizations filled the political void left by the state and
began to prosper in the rural departments. Polarization in the
countryside was further compounded by a significant increase







8 Timothy Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin
America, (Princeton, 1992), p. 116.
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and human rights abuses heightened contempt and hostility
towards the government, which ultimately proved
counterproductive to national integration and benefitted the
insurgency. Thousands were arrested and interrogated on the
hope of catching a few guerrillas.' 88
In the United States, media headlines were
continually filled with reports of the "cocaine epidemic" and
the spread of drug related violence.' 89President Reagan
threatened to impose foreign aid sanctions against Peru unless
Garcia began serious efforts to control coca production."'°
As with most Latin American countries, Peru did not favor
blame for the drug indulgence of the United States, and
several state officials publicly denounced the drug war as a
violation of sovereignty. 191 Dependent upon U.S. foreign aid
to buffer the economy, and having little choice, Garcia
188Strong, p.136-138.
189Department of Justice, p. 5.
"'
9 Harold E. Foster, "The Drug-Debt Link," The Christian
Science Monitor, November 15, 1989.
191 "Reaction to the U.S. War on Drugs," ABC World News Tonight,
American Broadcasting Company, April 24, 1990. Interview with
Peruvian Prime Minister, Guillermo Larco-Cox.
Martin Merzer, "Drugs in the Americas: In a Hemisphere
Being Corrupted by the Influence of Drugs, Nothing Less than the
Sovereignty of Some Nations at Stake," Miami Herald, September 3,
1989.
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consented to a series of counternarcotics operations against
coca growers assisted by U.S. DEA personnel." 92
Consequently, the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV) was
the identified hot spot for not only coca production, but a
Sendero stronghold as well. "Operation Condor" was a seven
phased joint operation of DEA and Peruvian narcotics police
(UMOPAR) to conduct coca eradication. It was the operational
predecessor of future eradication efforts, and provided Garcia
with the chance to strike at the guerrillas, which were
beginning to cripple legitimate state enterprises."'
Although its success was debated, the operation identified the
complexity and magnitude of a well organizea, deeply
entrenched, and economically thriving coca industry in the
region. There was also abounding speculation of narcotic
profits funding terrorist groups rampant after the raid.194
Garcia outwardly supported the antidrug efforts,
but his support appeared contingent upon obtaining an increase
192United States Congress, House of Representatives, Cocaine
Production in the Andes, Hearing before the Select Committee on
Narcotics Abuse and Control, 101st Congress, June 7, 1989,
(Washington, D.C., 1989), p. 5-8.
19 3Gonzales, p. 108.
1 94United States Senate, U.S. International Drug Policy,
Multinational Strike Forces, Drug Policy in the Andean Nations,
Joint Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, 101st
Congress, November 6, 1989, (Washington, D.C., 1990), p. 67.
Statement of the Ambassador of Peru, Cesar G. Atala.
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of U.S. foreign aid."'9 This relationship was complicated by
DEA allegations of corruption against the UMOPAR, and human
rights abuses concerning the counterinsurgency campaign
conducted by the military in the emergency zones.'96
Relations were further strained by Garcia's insistence that
American foreign aid could not be contingent on separating
funds for counternarcotics from counterinsurgency, a condition
initially stipulated by U.S. Congress.7. Additionally, the
Peruvian military was not inclined to apply pressure on the
coca growing peasantry for fear of polarizing the rural
population and creating conditions conducive to Sendero
recruitment. 198
From 1987-1989, Peru's internal conditions
continued to significantly deteriorate throughout the country,
and the ability of the state to operate was further reduced.
The gross domestic product dropped 28 percent, and real wages
1 9 5Mark R. Day, "Peru Balks at U.S. Military Aid Offer,"
Christian Science Monitor, May, 3, 1990, p. 3. Garcia was adamantly
opposed to an increased militarization of the drug war without an
equal increase of economic aid from the United States.
1 96Strong, p. 106.
197Gabriel Marcella, "Mutual Imperatives for Change in
Hemispheric Strategic Policy: Issues for the 1990's," EvolvinQ U.S.
Strategy for Latin America and the Caribbean, ed. L. Erik
Kjonnerod, (National Defense University Press, 1992), p. 54-56.
19 8Strong, p. 150. Nor did the military commanders trust
Garcia, or the UMOPAR, both of which they thought were pocketing
foreign aid money.
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(for those holding jobs) fell 60 percent."' The consumer
price index rose cumulatively 3500 percent, while government
spending was three times larger than state revenues. 2 "
National labor union strikes, political protests, and social
violence increased. Garcia's public opinion approval rating
dropped to 10 percent, and it was speculated a military coup
was likely.20' The only economic prosperity was coca
production, which increased 100 percent between 1985-1988, and
the state was attempting to neutralize it. 20 2
c. Alberto Fujimori 1990-1993
The economic and social policies of the previous
four administrations set the stage for the July 1990
presidential elections. Alberto Keinya Fujimori, an
agronomist engineer without any previous political experience,
obtained a landslide victory over the APRA candidate Mario
Vargas Llosa. The national elections were overshadowed by a
199Rudolph, p. 103.
2 0
°Felipe Ortiz de Zavallos, The Peruvian Puzzle, (New York,
1989), p. 40-41.
"...McCormick, p.39-43.
202Drug Enforcement Administration, National Narcotics
IntelliQence Consumers Committee Report 1990, (washington, D.C.,
1991), p. 5-11. Coca production increased from 70,000 tons in 1985
to 151,000 tons in 1988.
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combination of racism, 203 and unprecedented political
violence. 2"4 Fujimori was able to capitalize on the ethnic
divisions by referring to his opponent as an instrument of the
white oligarchy, and appealing to the Indian population as a
man of the working class.2"S Although political participation
in the rural districts has remained low since 1979,206 the
strategy worked for Fujimori as he carried the majority in 23
of the 24 departments in Peru.20 7
On August 8, 1990, ten days after his
inauguration, the Fujimori administration announced it would
begin a series of austerity measures designed for economic
stabilization and eventual growth. Dubbed "Fujishock" by the
Peruvian media, the elements of the program included; most
trade tariffs and restrictions lifted; implemented a hiring
freeze on government companies; furloughed all employees hired
within the last six months of the Garcia administration;
2 03Strong, p. 53. Fujimori is of Japanese descent, and during
the campaign anti-Japanese xenophobia occurred.
204Michael. Reid, "Violent Campaign: Peru Votes under the Shadow
of a Gun",Christian Science Monitor, November 10, 1989. Sendero
attempted to assassinate Fujimori in a car bombing, and numerous
political rallies erupted in violence. Consequently prior to the
national elections 16,000 were detained by police.
205Rudolph, p. 143. Fujimori extensively campaigned in the
rural districts using a tractor as a podium.
206Strong, p. 53. Approximately one-fifth of the registered
voters in the rural districts participated in the elections.
2 07St. John, p. 214.
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substantial tax increases; and, significant price increases of
public services. 2 "While intended for economic recovery, the
program has done nothing to relieve the economic pressure and
social tensions in the countryside. Conversely, the austerity
program aggravated social unrest in the shantytown section of
Lima, and facilitated Sendero infiltration of urban areas. 209
Shortly after assuming office and "inheriting a
comatose economy kept alive only with large injections of coca
dollars", 2" Fujimori attended Cartegena II, in May of 1991.
Similar to Garcia, Fujimori initially refused to accept the
military aid package offered by the United States as part of
the Andean Strategy, on the grounds that an increase of
military aid would be irrelevant without large increases in
economic aid to promote social welfare. 2 ' However, the
Fujimori government recognized U.S. support was critical to
restructuring Peru's foreign debt with the IMF, which would
tremendously impact proposed economic reforms, and came to
terms on the Andean Strategy. On May 14, 1991, President
Fujimori signed the U.S./Peruvian Agreement on
2OBSt. John, p. 212-215.
20 9Gordon H. McCormick, From the Sierra to the Cities: The




2 t Merrill, p. 38.
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Counternarcotics Programs, and subsequently received a $750
million loan from the United States and Japan intended to help
Peru cancel defaults owed to international creditors. 21 2
Fujimori stated combating the insurgency was his
top priority on the national agenda, but corruptive influences
in the legislative and judicial system were hindering the
effort. Citing this as justification, on April 5, 1992,
Fujimori suspended congress, dissolved the courts, arrested
suspected political dissenters, and suspended the 1979
Constitution. 2 3  This action, combined with an incident in
which the Peruvian military shot down a U.S. Air Force C-130
on drug surveillance,214 caused enough concern in the United
States that President Bush suspended all but humanitarian
aid.2 15 In light of Peru's fragile democratic foundations and
entrenched insurgency, Fujimori's "autocoup" may have been




214United States Congress, House of Representatives, The
Situation in Peru and the Future of the War on Drugs, Joint Hearing
before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 102nd Congress, May 7,
1992, (Washington, D.C., 1992), p. 44. Testimony of General George
Joulwan, Commander, U.S. Southern Command
21 5United States Congress, House of Representatives, The
Situation in Peru and the Future of the War on Drugs, Joint Hearing
before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 102nd Congress, May 7,
1992, (Washington, D.C., 1992), p. 9.
Carrol J. Doherty, "Lawmakers support decision to halt
funding for Peru," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, vol. 50,
(Washington, D.C., April 11, 1992).
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warranted in regards to purging corrupt institutions, but it
appears to be more symptomatic of a military reaction to
Peruvian congressional autonomy.2"6
The capture of Sendero leader Abimael Guzman in
October 1992, bolstered Fujimori's popularity in Lima, and
seemed to legitimize the reasons for suspending constitutional
rights. However, its impact has been negligible in reducing
the high level of Sendero activity, both in the countryside
and within the urban areas, which was the impetus for
Fujimori's coup.217
During the summer of 1993, a new congress was
reelected and recently ratified the latest amended
constitutional draft. In October 1993, a national referendum
was held to vote on the new constitution. Of the registered
voters who participated, 55 percent approved, and 45 percent
did not, which was contrary to earlier poll conducted by Lima
Television Network. 218 Many Peruvians have expressed concern
216
"Lawmakers 'impeach' Fujimori," Facts on File, vol. 52, (New
York, April 16, 1992).
2 1 7
"Expert Predicts Continuing Shining Path Operations,"
Madrid EFE, September 7, 1993, Foreign Broadcast Information
Service: Latin America, FBIS-LAT-93-174, September, 10, 1993.
"Peru Rebels Massacre Dozens in Worst Attack since Leader's
Capture," Miami Herald, August 21, 1993.
2 1 8
"Poll Reveals Support for New Constitution and Fujimori,"
Lima Television Network, October 11, 1993, Foreign Broadcast
Information Service: Latin America, FBIS-LAT-93-197, October 14,
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over the expansion of executive powers, and fear it may
facilitate a move towards authoritarian government. 2 19
The 1993 Constitution amended the following laws:
allows the immediate reelection of the President without a one
term break; authorizes the President to dissolve Congress if
it issues a vote of no confidence in the Executive; provides
the death penalty for certain terrorism convictions; and,
establishes the Supreme Court as the ultimate reviewing
authority in all legal matters."22
Additionally, there has evolved a pronounced
division between the legislative branch and the military over
human rights issues in counterinsurgency zones.
221
Legislators want the insurgency destroyed to facilitate
national reconstruction, but face a dilemma between Sendero's
progressive advancement and the military's collateral damage
1993, p. 63.
219
"Belaunde-Terry Says Approval of New Constitution 'Will lead
to Civil War'," La Republica, (L.Lma, September 12, 1993), p. 11.
Nathaniel C. Nash, "In Peru, a 'second coup' reveals the
upper hand: Alberto Fujimori remains in power only as long as the
military wishes it," New York Times, May 12, 1993.
22 0
"Differences Between Old and New Constitution," Quehacer,
July-August 1993, Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Latin
America, FBIS-LAT-93-197, October 14, 1993, p. 67.
22 1Nathaniel C. Nash, "Army deploys tanks in Peru in a warning
to new Congress: Peruvian Army sends tanks into Lima to protest
Congressional investigation in its role in the killings of students
in 1992," New York Times, April 26, 1993.
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to society. The insurgency has effectively raised the costs
of state sovereignty high enough that the government is unable
to physically operate or control a large percentage of its
territory.2 22 The state has been unwilling to structurally
alter its socioeconomic foundations in the rural regions, and
consequently must depend on military force to modify political
behavior. As a result, state sovereignty will be measured by
the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency, and its ability to
deny resources to the guerrillas in a manner which does not
alienate or mobilize rural society against the state. 223
Historically, the counterinsurgency campaign has
failed because the state has not been able to reconstruct a
strong institutional infrastructure, or maintain a physical
presence in the rural areas to prevent Sendero advances. 2 24
The insurgency has made progressive territorial advancesin 20
of 24 departments in Peru, and forced the government to either
deploy troops into "Emergency Zones" to restore order, or
tolerate the loss of territory to Sendero. Since the
assignment of the military to Peru's internal war in late
December 1982, the structure of the counterinsurgency campaign
22 2Merrill, p. 41.
223Thomas Kamm, "Valley in Peru may show a glimpse of things to
come: Government intensifies war on rebels, but villagers get
caught in the middle (escalating war between Peruvian Army and
Shining Path Guerrillas)," The Wall Street Journal, April 8, 1992.
224Leites and Wolf, p. 153.
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has been dramatically transformed from General Huaman
Centeno's proposed 1984 strategy which stated:
There will be no solution to this while work is
not given to the people, and to the peasant
communities: seeds, fertilizer and pesticides...
nothing has been done for the countryside. It is the
other culture, the one which has been forgotten... In
the face of extraordinary situations, extraordinary
responses are needed.
The new strategy shifts the emphasizes more
towards tactical engagements with the enemy, and places body
counts of killed guerrillas over institutional
restructuring,2 2" which is similar to early counterinsurgency
doctrines used by France and the United States in Vietnam.226
The bulk of the Peruvian military is garrisoned in Lima, which
results in small concentrations of military units operating in
the countryside. As a result, the counterinsurgency force is
spread too thin over large areas and cannot provide protection
to peasant communities which refuse Sendero demands. The
state counterinsurgency posture appears to rely more on
intimidation rather than on protection, which only serves to
22 5
"Fujimori News Conference Covers Counterterrorism Policies,"
Asuncion Radio, Lima, Joint Publications Research Service Report:
Terrorism, JPRS-TOT-93-034-L, September 1, 1993.
226 Special Operations Research Office, Case Studies in
InsurQency and Revolutionary Warfare: Vietnam 1941-1954,
(The American University, 1964), p. 105-115.
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exacerbate polarization, rather than to encourage national
integration.227
Additionally, and more often than not, the
peasants were routinely victimized by the troops sent to
protect them. 228 Human rights abuses have directly undermined
the efficacy of the state, and are counterproductive to
reestablishing sovereignty. In 1992, Amnesty International
reported Peru had the highest incidence of "disappeared"
people in Latin America, with over 306 alleged documented
cases. Of these 306 Peruvians; 23 were subsequently found
dead; 34 were tortured, incarcerated or released; and, 243
remain missing. 229 The Fujimori government is waging a
military campaign in an attempt to overcome a political and
social defeat in the countryside. Through its conduct of the
counterinsurgency campaign, the state is indirectly
encouraging popular support of the Sendero, and marginalizes
it's own sovereignty.230
227Strong, p. 133.
22 8James Brooke, "Rapists in Uniform: Peru Looks the Other
Way," New York Times, April 29, 1993.
229Amnesty International, The 1992 Report on Human RiQhts
Around the World, (Alameda, 1992), p. 213.
23 0Jose Comas, "Rudolpho Robles, Peruvian General in Exile:
'There Is A Core of Uniformed Gangsters in the Army," Pais, May,
19, 1993.
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C. ANALYSIS AND SUMMIARY
When analyzing the current condition of Peruvian internal
sovereignty, and the directional trends of domestic policy,
the prospects for the state appear dismal. Built on weak,
feudalist institutions which propagated social stratification
and ethnic segregation, Peru has evolved into a dichotomous
state, with diametrically opposing societies, economies, and
cultures. Centuries of isolation from the mainstream of
political inclusion and economic prosperity, have caused the
indigenous population to remain autonomous, closed to
integration, and resistant to state authority. Internal
sovereignty has been historically tenuous throughout Peru, and
particularly marginalized in rural departments.
Performance indicators of internal sovereignty analyzed
throughout this chapter, demonstrated specific institutional
weaknesses, continued erosion of state services and efficacy,
and a loss of political legitimacy. The range of Peruvian
sovereignty within the parameters of TABLE I, is marginalized
at the lower end of the spectrum as evidenced by:
a) continued loss of ultimate authority;
b) lack of territorial control;
c) inability to effect political compliance; and,
d) dysfunctional state institutions.
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As a result of these factors, Peru is experiencing a rapid
erosion of state authority which has been accelerated by the
Sendero insurgency, and indirectly influenced by the cocaine
trade. State response has been over-reactive towards political
neutrals, counterproductive in addressing fundamental causes
of social activism, and lacking in both legitimacy and
efficacy. Additionally, popular support for the government and
state institutions appears to be declining.2" A recent
public opinion poll submitted at the Third Ibero-American
Summit Meeting, held in Madrid, provided the following
results:
- 50 percent of the polled Peruvians were displeased
with the performance of the government;
- 69 percent felt rapid changes needed to occur;
- 73 percent thought conditions are worse than a year
ago;
- 55 percent distrusted the functioning of Congress;
- 59 percent distrusted the judicial system;
- 57 percent distrusted the security forces;
- 74 percent distrusted the political parties;
2 3 1
"Peru: Fujimori's Poll Rating Takes a Tumble," Latin
American Weekly Report, (London, May 27, 1993).
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- 43 percent did not feel they were citizens of the
state.232
Application of the analytical model illustrates it is
detrimental for the Peruvian state to waste resources and risk
increased alienation of the rural peasantry in pursuit of coca
eradication. Ultimately the state is faced with a dilemma of
fighting the Sendero insurgency or eliminating coca
production, but it cannot suppress one without the other.233
As explained in the next chapter, the insurgents control
enough territory to prevent the state from concentrating
resources exclusively into coca producing regions without
placing other areas at risk.234
With the fragile political and economic history of Peru,
it is doubtful the government is stable enough to withstand
continued multiple crises.23S Neither can it be deduced by
232
"Continent Pessimistic About March of Democracy," Cambio 16,
July 19, 1993, ForeiQn Information Broadcast Service, FBIS-LAT-93-
178, September 16, 1993.
233 Jose Luis Reyna, "Narcotics as a Destabilizing Force for
Source Countries and Non-source Countries," The Latin American
Narcotics Trade and U.S. National Security, ed. Donald J. Mabry,
(New York, 1989).
Tracy Roden, "Fighting Drugs Without Fighting the Shining
Path: Is it Possible?" Westwatch, November/December 1991.
2 34Merrill, p. 2-6. Recent estimates place the territory under
direct control of Sendero at 40% of the country.
23
'Hobart Spalding, "Peru Today: Still on the Brink," Monthly
Review, vol. 44, no. 10 (New York, March 1993).
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increasing U.S. aid and military hardware that the policy
goal, reducing the supply at its source, will be achieved. 23 6
Drug traffickers offer enough hard currency as incentive to
make growing coca leaf worth any possible risks to peasant
farmers, and have demonstrated the ability to corrupt both the
UMOPAR and military forces sent to eradicate the crops."23
236
"1U.S. Will Continue Working Alongside Nations with the
Political Will to Fight Drugs," Comercio, (Lima, August 14, 1993).
2 3 7Stepahn C. Trujillo, "Corruption and Cocaine in Peru," New
York Times, April 7, 1992.
Lauren Weiner, "Battle Against Drugs Is a Threat to Peru's
Beloved Coca Economy," Washington Times, January 16, 1990.
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III. THE RISE OF ILLEGITIMATE ACTIVITY
In the margins of receded internal sovereignty, two major
illegitimate activities have emerged: the cocaine trade; and,
the Sendero Luminoso insurgency. Initially, the coca trade was
merely an economic extension of the traditional use by
indigenous societies, and was confined within the country.
However, the popularity of cocaine as recreational drug in the
United States expanded the market dimensions, and caused coca
production to transform into an illegal export. The Sendero,
on the other hand, is a political response to historic
conditions dictated by the state. Both activities have merged
as a result of mutual necessity, the coca growers need
protection from predatory traffickers, and the Sendero needs
the revenues it obtains in return. 2 38
The fundamental threat to Peru's internal sovereignty is
the Sendero Luminoso insurgency. The guerrillas have emerged
as a serious, viable threat to the state authority, and have
been especially successful in the rural districts where
government institutions were weakest. The insurgents have
organized coca farmers, and directly influenced U.S.efforts to
23 8Jose Alvarez Indacochea, "The Shining Path Makes More Than
(US) $100 Million From Drug Traffic," Comercio, (Lima, March 19,
1993).
87
reduce cocaine supply. As a result internal sovereignty is
being challenged, and the drug eradication effort has been
checked by Sendero.
A. THE SHINING PATH INSURGENCY
Sendero Luminoso is unlike any other insurgent or
guerrilla group that has ever operated in Latin
America.
- Bernard Aronson,
Assistant Secretary of State,
March, 12, 1992
Various experts in the field of guerrilla insurgencies
have called the Sendero Luminoso (SL) everything from the
Peruvian Khmer Rouge to the most highly organized and vicious
guerrilla army in modern times. Since launching their
offensive in 1980, the SL has caused over $20 billion in
economic losses, conducted over 23,000 terrorist actions, and
has been responsible for over 26,000 deaths (including over
300 mayors since 1986) .240 They are highly ideological,
239United States Congress, House of Representatives, The Threat
of the Shining Path to Democracy in Peru, Hearings before the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, 102nd Congress, March 11 and 12,
1992, (Washington, D.C., 1992), p. 128.
24 0Gustavo Gorriti, "The War of the Philosopher King", The New
Republic, June 18, 1990, p. 15-19.
Katherine Ellison, "Peru Mayor Risks Death to Aid Slum",
Miami Herald, June 23, 1991, p. 6A.
Merrill, p. 9.
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meticulously organized, brutally efficient, and pose an
immediate threat to the state of Peru.
This chapter will argue the rise of the Sendero insurgency
based on the following:
Proposition 2- In order to establish itself, an
illegitimate activity must raise the relative cost of
sovereignty to a point that the state cannot maintain control.
To accomplish this, the activity must: operate within the
institutional vacuum created by a weak state; satisfy a
social, economic, or political demand; and, present a viable
alternative to its targeted constituency in order to achieve
political compliance, mobilize resources and establish safe
operating zones.
In order to understand the dynamics involved in how an
insurgency evolves into a viable threat to state sovereignty,
reference to Gordon McCormick's analytical model of the
dynamics of revolutionary insurgencies is required.24"'
Accordingly, guerrillas which are organizationally cohesive
and exercise long term strategic goals, are more likely to
succeed over loosely formed guerrillas groups with spontaneous
"
24
'As contained in previously cited works by Gordon H.
McCormick.
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tactical objectives. 242 Key elements of this theory argue a
successful insurgency is based on:
a) sound organizational principles and group cohesion;
b) feasible tactical doctrines and strategies for victory;
c) mobilizing social resources; and
d) establishing legitimacy as a counterstate institution.
The more closely aligned the insurgency is to these
principles, the higher the ratio of success against a
moderately strong state, and areas of hostile population.
Loosely organized and tactically spontaneous guerrillas groups
usually suffer defeat by the state, which is able to draw on
substantially more resources than the insurgents.
The table below illustrates an success assessment for
optimal insurgency composition:
TABLE 3
Probability of Insurgent Success
based on Degrees of Organization and Strategic Goals
Highly Organized/ Poorly Organized/
Long Term Strategy- High Long Term Strategy- Medium
Highly Organized/ Poorly Organized/
Spontaneous action- Medium Spontaneous action- Low
(Source, McCormick)
242Gordon H. McCormick, From the Sierra to the Cities: The
Urban Campaign of the ShininQ Path, (Rand Corporation, 1992),
p. 65-69.
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The insurgent groups which possess high degrees of
organization and long term strategies coupled with sound
tactical objectives are more probable to succeed than poorly
organized groups reacting spontaneously. Insurgencies between
the high and low range are on the margin between success and
failure. Poorly organized guerrilla groups which use
spontaneous actions without integration into a long term
strategy for victory will usually disintegrate in the face of
even weak state forces.
1. Origins and Ideology
The Sendero Luminoso, was conceptualized and founded
in 1970, by university professor, Abimael Guzman. The
organization was based on the writings of Jose Carlos
Mariategui, a Lima sociologist and journalist who was
responsible for the initial development of the Peruvian
Communist Party in 1928.243 Mariategui's ideology was
formulated on the premise that the Spanish Conquest overthrew
the indigenous, and legitimate Peruvian native society, and
subsequently delineated the racial and economic strata for the
following centuries. Mariategui advocated an inversion of the
existing socioeconomic structure in Peru, and restoration of
243 Gordon H. McCormick, The Shining Path and the Future of
Peru, p. 4-5.
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the Inca social order prevalent between 1200-1530, in essence,
a type of "Inca communism". 244
Guzman, a philosophy student, and Peruvian Communist
Party member, adopted Mao Zedong's peasant based revolutionary
strategies, Karl Marx's doctrines of logicai socialist order,
and applied Mariategui's class struggle of Indians and
Mestizos under the linages of the European Spanish elite.
These revolutionary concepts were applied to a strategy for
armed insurgency and overthrow of the Peruvian government. 24S
Three fundamental concepts contained in Sendero
literature have been manifested through events in Peru over
the last 10 years are:
First, the revolution will be born in the countryside
of the peasant proletariat and gather the momentum and
strength needed to defeat the cities;
Second, government armies can be defeated by forces
smaller and less equipped if strategies and campaigns are
conceived by ideological, meticulously organized, devoted
militants;
24 4Chang-Rodriguez, p. 67.
24 5Strong, p. 14-17.
92
Third, "revolutionary violence is a universal
law. 11246
These concepts and ideology contained in Sendero
literature follow similar revolutionary theories found in the
writings of Ernesto "Che" Guevera elaborating on the Cuban
Revolution.247• tem three is almost verbatim from the
revolutionary doctrines of Mao Zedong. The ideology advocated
and preached by Sendero is not original, enlightening, or
particularly inspiring to mainstream Latin Americans. However,
to the rural Peruvian Indian population, historically
polarized from the state, it is a viable and logical
alternative to centuries of government neglect and
exploitation.
Leadership is paramount in the formation and ultimate
success of the insurgency, and often an insurgency movement
begins with a charismatic individual or group.24 8 In the case
of SL, Guzman became the catalyst for harvesting the long
suppressed animosity prevalent in the rural peasantry,
especially in the department of Ayacucho. 24 9 Because of its
24 6Abimael Guzman, as interviewed by El Dairio, July 1988.
Reprinted by The Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru,
(Berkeley, 1991), p.31.
247Wright, p. 88-89.
24 8Leites and Wolf, p. 23.
24 9
"The Indian Question In Latin America", The Wilson
Quarterly, (Washington,DC, 1990),p.22-32.
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predominantly indian and mestizo population, its economic
underdevelopment, and years of administrative neglect by the
government, it was fertile ground for Guzman's ideological
movement. 250 Guzman shrewdly positioned himself into one of
the basic social institutions which touch all aspects of
life... he became a professor at the University of San
Cristobal de Huamanga in the Ayacucho department in 1963.•1
Guzman used his position as a philosophy professor to
spread his own ideological convictions, and to consolidate
support into a cohesive group which ultimately evolved into
the Sendero Luminoso (The Shining Path) 252 Guzman gained
recruits by using the conditions in Ayacucho as evidence of
the state's unwillingness to address fundamental issues
confronting national integration, and polarized indian
societies. As these recruits became university graduates, they
returned to villages and cities as teachers, lawyers, or other
positions of influence, to spread the word of Guzman and
expand the ranks of the movement.253
215 Rudolph, p. 87. Ayacuho was considered to be the
economically poorest department in Peru. It had the fewest doctors,
the lowest per capita income, the least amount of roadways, and was





2 52McCormick, p. 5.
2 5 3Strong, p. 17-19.
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2. Organization and Strategy
Sendero's strategy, then, is to use violence to
destroy democratic institutions, to stop citizens from
participating in local government, to destroy the
functioning economy, and to cripple programs which
provide aid and services to the population.2 54
- Bernard Aronson,
Assistant Secretary of State,
March, 12, 1992
Meticulously and methodically a devoted cadre of
disciples formed that recruited and indoctrinated within their
respective townships, and slowly began establishing support
bases throughout the countryside. Organizationally, the rural
infrastructure of the SL is comparable to the organization
strategies used by Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam. This organizational
doctrine emphasizes:
a) to develop new groups within the organization for
a united front;
b) to expand the organization into the cities;
c) to incorporate groups and regions outside the
core organization for support; and,





4United States Congress, House of Representatives, The Threat
of the Shining Path to Democracy in Peru, Hearings before the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, 102nd Congress, March 11 and 12,
1992, (Washington, D.C., 1992), p. 128.
2 5 5Special Operations Research Office, p. 87-89.
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From 1970-1979 SL maintained a low profile. Emphasis
was placed on establishing solid bases of physical support and
institutionalizing Sendero ideology. A politically motivated
army of militants conducted an aggressive conversion campaign
aimed at the rural peasantry in several departments. Unlike
their state counterparts, Sendero was patient and thorough in
developing an institutionalized, ideological foundation, and
consolidating support before advancing operaticns to the next
_evel.` 6
Coordinated and directed by a central committee
comprised of Guzman and his top lieutenants, the Sendero
national strategy is a tactical framework governed by the
central command, but allows for autonomous actions at the
regional and sub-regional level. This has allowed for mobile,
self sufficient units, flexible to dynamic changes in the
political and military environment, and able to remain almost
constantly on the offensive.2 "7
Guzman's strategy for revolutionary success is based
on the following objectives:
a) agitation of the masses and armed propaganda;
b) sabotage against Peru's economic system;








d) the conquest and expansion of the revolution's
support base and strengthening the guerrilla army;
e) general civil war, siege of the cities and the
collapse of state power.25'
The five-phase strategy, while providing a framework
for revolution, is dynamic to the prevailing situations and
modified accordingly to achieve the ultimate goals of Sendero.
Although severely outgunned and outnumbered Sendero attempts
to nullify the Army's advantage by concentrating on low risks
high gain targets that provide political impact and
psychological gains to the movement.
The net effect of Sendero's grassroot organizational
structural and long term strategic goals, is that it allows
the insurgency a broad base of rural support based upon
functional institutional foundations. This permits Sendero to
consolidate and expand, which continually frustrates state
counterinsurgency efforts. Sendero's political durability and
longevity have enabled it to maintain consistent institutional
and territorial expansion against the state. To obtain
political support from apathetic rural peasants What Sendero
cannot accomplish through persuasion, it gains by selected use
of terror. The notable increase of departments under emergency
258 McCormick, p. 51. Notable is the dependency of Lima for 60-
70% of its food brought in from the interior, along Andean highways
with strategically important mountain passes which are easily
closer by dynamite.
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decree, the tremendous rise in political violence, and
Sendero's successful establishment of counter sovereignty,
serve to illustrate the institutional strength of the
insurgency.
B. THE COCA TRADE AND RURAL SUPPORT
One of the areas of historic concern to the United States
is the Upper Huallaga Valley, which is reputed to produce 60-
70 percent (520,000 acres) of Peru's coca paste export. An
estimated 580,000 peasants are actively engaged in coca leaf
production. 25 9Although much of the coca trade has
subsequently .oved from the valley and into adjacent areas,
the neutralization of this region is paramount to the success
of the Andean Strategy.260
Within the analytical parameters outlined in chapter one,
the following proposition is applied to not only the coca
trade, but also to the rural population as a body.
Proposition 3- The coca trade is the result of economic
underdevelopment by the state, and the expansion of global
demand for cocaine. The subsequent integration of the Shining
Path with the cocaine trade compounds the problem of state
sovereignty because coca eradication efforts alienate rural
2 5 9Strong, p.97.
26
°Brooke Larmer, "Gateway to Heaven: A Trip inside Peru's
Perilous Cocaine Valley," Newsweek, January 20, 1992.
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society, and ultimately expands the insurgent support base.
This in turn frustrates the state counterinsurgency program,
leads to increased repression and further erodes sovereignty.
According to Leities and Wolf in Rebellion and Authority,
active support may be providing the insurgents with loyalty,
food, shelter, and information. Passively, it could equate to
compliance or remaining silent when questioned by the
military. The insurgents may obtain support through influence,
coercion, or terror.261
McCormick further asserts that this support, whatever its
form, is easier to obtain in societies which have been self-
governing and unified in cause. Societies which have
experienced low degrees of autonomy are risky to insurgent
infiltration because of dominant state institutions and
networks. Societies displaying high degrees of solidarity are
more difficult to penetrate and organize, but quicker to unify
than fractionalized groups.
26 1Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Rebellion and Authority,
(Rand Corporation, 1970), p. 149.
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The following illustrates the strength assessment of
autonomy and solidarity in relation to insurgent infiltration
and support:
Table 4
Peasant Autonomy and Solidarity as Indicators
of Insurgent Support
High Autonomy/ Low Autonomy/
High Solidarity-High High Solidarity-Medium
High Autonomy/ Low Autonomy/
Low Solidarity-Medium Low Solidarity-Low
(Source, McCormick)
The optimal strength assessment for gaining insurgency
support is high. As with the previous tables, a medium
category is neutral and able to go either way. The worst
possible social framework would be low autonomy/low
solidarity.
In the case of rural Peru, this translates into townships
or villages which are absent of state administrations, and
homogeneous in class, culture, or common foe. Consequently,
the Sendero have exploited the situation in rural Peru to
their strategic and tactical advantage which has resulted in
entrenchment and expansion of the insurgency.
Attempts by the army to neutralize guerrilla strongholds
have usually resulted in repressive tactics, mass arrests, or
death, which net few if any Senderistas. This has been
particularly true in the coca growing regions where the
military is conducting counterinsurgency operations while
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narcotics police attempt eradication efforts. This dual
assault on both suspected sympathizers and coca growers, has
threatened the peasants only source of income, further
alienated rural society, and delegitimized the regime.> 2
Sendero has been able to mobilize rural peasantry by offering
security, and economic prosperity.
1. Rural Peasantry and the Coca Economy
What is of critical importance when planning coca leaf
eradication is the absolute control the Sendero Luminoso
exercises over the region. They are the undisputed masters of
the ground, and the "Robin Hood" of the coca farmers since
1985.-"
To the peasant, coca is the highest producing crop he
can grow. It can be harvested three to six times annually, and
nets two to three dollars a kilo. The unstable yield and
elastic profit margin of traditional crops, such as coffee or
corn, are susceptible to disease and dependent on
transportation to the market centers (which further reduce
prices paid to the peasant).
262McCormick, p.12-13.
263Alan Riding, "Rebels Disrupting Coca Eradication in Peru",
New York Times, 26 Jan. 1989,p.6, Sendero attacked and forced the
closure of the U.S./Peruvian forces forward operating base at Tingo
Maria, UHV.
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To the coca grower attempting to scratch out a living
in the UHV, Sendero Luminoso has become their closest ally.
The peasant is offered protection by the SL from violent drug
traffickers and the army in exchange for his loyalty and
support. The farmer is content to prosper, and enjoys relative
security under the Sendero umbrella. The SL gains popular
support, recruitment, and a safe operating base. Sendero is
also able to gain financially by charging the traffickers for
use of Peruvian real estate. Both appear firmly convinced that
cocaine abuse in America is a product of decaying capitalist
societies. According to one peasant farmer in the UHV:
Shining Path says we are going to support you if
you support us, so it is simple. Nobody could give a
damn if coca badly affects the United States. The
imperialists are drug addicts not us. 264
All three parties involved in the cocaine trade win:
the narcotics traffickers have a reliable source of coca leaf;
the peasants have a high yielding cash crop, and under
Sendero's political umbrella they have job security; the SL
has popular support, secure operating bases, a supply of





C. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS
Sendero's cohesive organization, ideological framework,
strategic doctrine, and popular support base have
significantly contributed to the success of the movement. The
strength and unity of the insurgency is high, popular support
is strong, and in comparison to the institutionally weak
Peruvian regime, the probability of success is good.
The insurgency has become a effective counterstate
institution throughout large areas of rural Peru. Sendero has
systematically eliminated rural state infrastructures through
coercion or violence, and presented itself to the peasantry as
a legitimate alternative. Through skillful maneuvering
Sendero's omni-presence in the countryside has effectively
replaced state administrations and allowed it to mobilize
social resources.
Even with the capture of Abimael Guzman, the Sendero
Luminoso still maintains an iron grip on the rural sectors of
Peru. Bombing, attempted assassinations, and terrorists
actions against anyone, including foreigners, opposed to them
continues at a rate of 6-10 incidents per day. 266 Continued
"
2 66William R. Long, "Attacks show rebels in Peru are still
effective," Los Ancreles Times, January 29, 1993.
"Shining Path Members Detonate Bomb in Eastern Lima Bank,"
Lima Television, October 31, 1993, Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, FBIS-LAT-93-209, November 1, 1993.
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counterinsurgency repression against neutral rural areas has
deepened polarization in the peasantry and increased support
for Sendero. These severe and randomly applied repressive
tactics by the state are exactly what the guerrillas want.
No matter how the argument is posed, coca crop eradication
cannot occur when the area is literally in hostile hands. In
the current situation, eradication efforts are futile unless
the United States is willing to sustain DEA personnel
casualties, and possibly risk involvement in Peru's internal
war. The Peruvian military does not have the resources to
physically occupy the UHV or surrounding coca producing
regions without sacrificing protection from the insurgency in
the cities. Without army protection the counternarcotics
forces are in tactical jeopardy. UMOPAR and DEA forces
combined have not impacted the coca trade, nor the demand in
the United States.2 67 The state has demonstrated it does not
have the political will, nor the institutional capability to
deter coca farmers in rural departments. SL has gone to
extremes in creating a legitimate counterstate, which offers
the peasant collective security and some degree of political
participation.
26
"James Brooke, "U.S. Fails to Slow Andes Drug Trade, Experts
Say," New York Times, November 21, 1993.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
Does the analytical model have applicability to the
internal conditions in Peru? Yes, not only to Peru, but to
several other Latin American insurgencies, such as Guatemala,
Colombia, and Argentina. Internal sovereignty is a result of
functional state institutions which promote national
integration, which can achieved through persuasion or use of
state coercion. Consequently, Peru is suffering from a
distinct lack of functional internal sovereignty which has
resulted in social conditions conducive to the emergence of
illegitimate activities such as insurgencies and the cocaine
trade. Therefore, the following generalizations can be
asserted concerning each of the major actors involved in the
marginalization of internal sovereignty:
a) the Sendero Luminoso is a cohesive, dynamically
organized insurgency which has statistically and
geographically expanded over the last 13 years;
b) the state has not deterred the insurgency, interrupted
its resources, restricted mobility, or structurally altered
its basis of support;
c) the state lacks the political will and the ability to
create socioeconomic institutions to support the rural
peasantry or deter coca growing;
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d) the rural peasantry has been historically autonomous,
politically polarized, and has consequently supported both the
cocaine trade and the Sendero insurgency.
In regards to the Andean Strategy, the Peruvian government
is in deplorable condition to open yet another front in their
war of survival. Peru lacks a solid, stable economy, and as a
result hyper-inflation, social discontent, and political
violence has escalated. Not only does this increase the
economic disparity between the urban and rural sectors, but it
provides plenty of ammunition for Sendero to capitalize on.
The state apparatus of the country is a framework marbled
with corruption, internal divisions, and fragmented political
institutions. As demonstrated by the Fujimori "autocoup" in
April 1992, and the subsequent dissolution of the
Constitution, Peru is not on solid democratic foundations.
The Andean Strategy has focused predominantly on increased
militarization within the source countries. A multi-national
military operation involving Andean countries in a concerted
effort at occupying, and destroying coca fields, laboratories,
and supply dumps, would certainly reduce cocaine production in
the region, but it would not rectify the economic motivation
behind the trade. A further argument against this option has
been historically demonstrated by Peruvian and U.S. forces
operating in the UHV; the moment troops withdrew from the
region, coca growing resumed.
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Drug cartels are speculated to have tons of cocaine
stockpiled throughout Latin America, therefore, even a full
scale para-military invasion into to coca greenbelt, would not
interrupt cocaine shipments to the United States.
Consequently, there is declining support for the entire policy
in the Clinton Administration, and source-nation eradication
efforts may eventually be put on hold.
Thus far, the objective of strengthening the Peruvian
anti-drug capabilities through increased military hardware and
training has proven to be limited in combating the coca
production or the Sendero insurgency. Further increases in
U.S. military aid packages would appear to have little, if
any, noticeable affect on coca supply. Increased U.S. military
presence in Peru would only exacerbate the current conflict by
providing the Sendero with an concrete example of "Yankee
imperialism", and pose significant risk to U.S. personnel
operating in the strongholds of SL.
Some proponents of the Andean Strategy urge continued
economic development and aid in combating coca production in
Peru. The goal of this objective is to provide an economic
buffer against the eventual loss of the coca industry and
assist the growth of the legitimate economy. However,
considering the total economic assistance to Peru for 1992 was
$103.1 million, and coca exports account for $1 billion gained
in return, it is doubtful these funds offered a viable
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incentive or alternative to the Peruvian economy or coca
farmer. 268
Policy makers in the United States are faced with the
dilemma of respecting the sovereignty of Latin American
nations on one hand, and popular support demanding a more
intense "war on drugs" on the other. To some Latin Americans,
the United States is too quick to invade, sanction, or
otherwise coerce countr- s into allowing DEA agents free rein
in pursuing coca cartels and production. To Americans,
witnessing the effects of drug-related violence in their
neighborhoods, and with prisons overflowing, not enough is
being done to stem the flow of cocaine into the country from
Latin America. The drug abuse problem in the United States has
no easy answer, and certainly no simple solution.
If democracy in Peru best serves U.S national interests,
then the United States should continue to supply Fujimori with
foreign aid and counterinsurgency assistance on the hope he
can mend the problems plaguing the country. If opening free
trade agreements with Latin America will bolster legitimate
enterprise and eventually replace the need fc•- farmers to grow
coca, then the U.S. should pursue it.
268 W.O.L.A.,p.10.
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The United States simply cannot press the issue of coca
eradication, considering the fragile political and economic
environment in Peru, without either toppling the government,
or involving itself in a very messy civil war under the guise
of eliminating drugs from U.S. streets.
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